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A Tale of Two Opinions: The Meaning of
Statutes and the Nature of Judicial
Decision-making in the Administrative Context
Katherine L. Vaughns*
After a long period of relative neglect, the subject of statutory
interpretation once again enjoys favor in the courts of
academic discourse?

The rise of the administrative state ignited an ongoing
debate on the role of the judiciary in interpreting statutes.
Professor Vaughns examines the majority and dissenting
opinions in Abourezk v. Reagan, interpreting a politicallycharged statutory provision i n a decision from the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, often characterized a s
one of the more ideologically polarized courts in the country.
Although both opinions follow t h e methodological
decision-making mandated by the Supreme Court's landmark
case of Chevron U.S.A.v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, they
nonetheless reach sharply contrary, result-oriented outcomes.
Meanwhile modem commentators have advanced more
sophisticated statutory interpretive theories to update
outmoded statutes and to encourage more judicial candor.
Abourezk thus provides an excellent vehicle for showing how
other interpretive methods play out in the context of a complex
case. Abourezk also illustrates how even the seemingly easy to
apply agency deference required by Chevron can be judicially

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I
would like to express my sincere appreciation to colleagues Bill Reynolds and
David Bogen for their invaluable contributions and helpful suggestions on earlier
drafts of this article and to Vidor Tervala, my research assistant on earlier
versions of this piece, whose contribution to this project was first-rate. I am also
grateful to Dean Donald G. Gifford for his fmancial support of this project. Any
errors are my own.
1. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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manipulated to satisfy individual agendas. Finally, Abourezk
reveals the heavy social costs that may result from a lack of
judicial candor.

The American legal system has moved rapidly from a
system of case law to one dominated by statutes applied by
agencies to control all aspects of our lives. Because many
statutory delegations to agencies occur at a high level of
generality, judges possess a good degree of maneuverability in
deciding how to apply the law. In order to cabin judicial
discretion and achieve congressional mandates, both candor
and sophisticated statutory analysis must be used in decisionmaking. In this article I examine one case in which both
qualities are lacking. Through a detailed analysis of the case, I
hope to shed some light on a highly controversial substantive
area2 and to provide an example of how to analyze difficult
problems of interpretation3 in the administrative context. In
the process, I hope to encourage students of statutory
interpretation to set aside discussions of abstract linguistics4
and easy examples5 and urge them t o consider diffcult real
world problems. Finally, I consider the role judicial candor
plays in statutory interpretation.

2. The case selected for discussion in this article involves the interpretation
of a statutory provision of the Immigration and Nationality Ad. Commentators
have variously described immigration law as "a constitutional oddity" and a "wild
card." Compare Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and The Principle of
Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 with Peter H. Schuck,
The IC2.ansformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM.L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).
3. Heretofore, "[sltatutory construction has been the backwater of legal
theory." Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 59, 59 (1988). Today, however,
"[a]cademic ferment concerning 'interpretation' has clearly reached the 'heady brew'
stage." Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.827, 827 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892). The Court in that case refused to follow the language of the statute,
declaring that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the . . . intention of its makers." Id. at 459. Also, "[sltatutes are not exercises in
private language. They should be read, like a contractual offer, to find their
reasonable import." Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 60. The instant case provides
such an example with the "mere presence or entry" versus "activities" dichotomy
discussed infra.
5. The stock examples are "vehicles in the park" and "letting blood in the
streets of Bologna." See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 540, 543
(1988).
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The case selected for this examination involves the
interpretation of a statutory provision in the Immigration and
as amended ("INK),' involving the
Nationality Act of 1952,~
exclusion of aliens8 from entry into the United States.'
Although the provision at issue has subsequently been
amended to eliminate the specific interpretive question the
court addressed, the recent amendment itself raises intriguing
questions for the various theories of statutory interpretation
that currently dominate the field.'' Specifically, would any of
the modern statutory approaches advanced by legal scholars
have remedied the concerns that were eventually resolved
through the legislative process? In other words, which of the
theories, if any, that focus on statutory interpretation as
evolutionary, would have best served the cause of the
legislative resolution ultimately fashioned by Congress? And
what of judicial candor? Would it have informed the legislative
process as well?
OF THE INTERPRETNE
INQUIRY
11. THESUBJECT

This article thus critically examines the jurisprudence of
two judges in a single case--Abourezk v. Reagan;" one judge
strains to avoid applying the rule of law while the other strains
to apply it. Judge Ginsburg for the majority temporarily
avoided the aliens' outright exclusion by remanding the case for
irrelevant information, while Judge Bork, in dissent, affirmed
their exclusion by selective reliance on legislative history.12
6. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C. & 50 U.S.C. app.).
7. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). For a summary of United
States immigration law see CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCHSERV., LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS,
U.S. IMMIGRATION
LAW AM) POLICY: 1952-1979 (1979). The INA is a
comprehensive statute which regulates U.S. immigration laws. For a description of
developments and proposals leading up to the passage of the INA see EDWARDP.
IMMIGRATION
POLICY1798-1965,
HUTCHINSON,
LEGISLATIVE
HISTORYOF AMERICAN
251-313 (1981).
8. The word "alien" is a term of art in immigration law and is not intended
to be derogatory or disparaging. Under the INA, the term "alien" means any
person not a citizen or national of the United States. INA 8 101(a)(3) (1992). The
term "national" means a person owing permanent allegiance to a nation state. INA
5 lOl(aX21) (1992).
9. More specifically, 8 212(a) of the INA lists all current classes of
excludable aliens. 8 U.S.C. 8 1182(a) (Supp. V 1993).
lo. See INA 8 212(aX3XC) (1991) and infia notes 216-28 and accompanying
text.
11. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd per curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
12. Then Court of Appeals Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority
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Abourezk was selected because of the controversy it highlights
and because it fits the paradigm case described by Professor
Diver: a case "where a legislature entrusted the administration
of a statute to an agency, subject to judicial review."13 With
the delegation of authority to executive agencies to enforce and
implement the statute that Congress has charged them to
administer, those agencies have the first opportunity to pass on
the interpretive issue which is later presented to a court.
Thus the "Age of Statutes" has "significantly altered the
ground rules" of statutory interpretation.14 Judges now must
share their interpretive functions with officials in the executive
which is not a natural task for some.
branch of govern~nent,'~
This is particularly true in certain areas of the law such as
immigration law. Long considered "a maverick . . . in our public
law,"16 immigration is an area of law in which the role of the
judiciary is considered rather circumspect. In fact, "no other
area of American law has been so radically insulated and
divergent from those fundamental norms of constitutional
right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate
the rest of our legal system."17
These statements exemplify the tension inherent in the
judicial process when judges confront issues in immigration
law. The discord arises because the power of the sovereign over
immigration is plenary," a power so great that it permits
Congress t o "regularly make[] rules that would be unacceptable
if applied t o citizens."lg Moreover, the Supreme Court has
opinion. The dissenting jurist, Judge Robert H. Bork, now resigned from the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, was the center of controversy when
his Supreme Court nomination was blocked in late 1987 by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
13. Diver, supra note 1, at 580.
14. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO.
L.J. 353, 395-96 (1989).
15. Id. at 395.
16. Schuck, supra note 2, at 1.
17. Id.
18. The exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have
no counterpart in the federal government's power to regulate the conduct of its
own citizens. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 8 1 (1976). See, e.g., Lees v. United
States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893) (congressional exclusionary power is "absolute"
and "not open to challenge in the courts"); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (''conclusive upon the judiciary").
19. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80. For commentary that challenges the continued
viability of the plenary power doctrine, see, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545 (1990); Schuck, supra note 2;
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repeatedly emphasized that "over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over" the
admission (and conversely the exclusion) of aliens.20
Supreme Court precedent "[has] long recognized the power
t o expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government's political departments largely
immune from judicial control."21 Well-established case law
requires judges to defer to agency determinations and statutes
in this area.22The formal role of the judiciary, therefore, is
quite limited. But a limited judicial role, of course, can lead to
an "unjust" result in individual cases, a perception that often
places temptation before the j u d i ~ i a r y . ~
That temptation often leads judges astray, causing them to
stretch the correct result while maintaining the formal requirements of our legal system. These rulings can be made to
appear, at least on their face, consistent with established
precedent. Examined more closely, however, the ruling can be
seen as a subterfuge for not deciding the case as precedent
would dictate. Judges who write such opinions have, in effect,
substituted their own judgment for that of the agency,
Congress, or higher courts." Such action, of course, flies
squarely in the face of Supreme Court mandates as well as
established notions of acceptable judicial behavior.
Abourezk involves a statutory provision that relates to the
government's denial of nonimmigrant (temporary visitors) visas
based on ideological and national interests (i.e., political)

Legomsky, supra note 2.
20. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909),
quoted approvingly in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
21. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).
22. E.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 US. 139, 145 (1981); see also, e.g., Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (power "largely immune" from judicial review).
But see id. at 793 n.5 (accepting a "limited" judicial responsibility to review even
those congressional decisions concerning the exclusion of aliens).
23. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 112-23 (1992) (explaining the choice between
jurists favoring rules (a more restrictive approach) and jurists favoring standards (a
more flexible approach) as differing on the basis of their conceptions of the judicial
role). "But particular choices between rules and standards take place in specific
political contexts, and, in those contexts, take account of the substance they will
govern." Id. at 123.
24. See, e.g., Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 144 (stating that courts may not
overturn an agency construction of a discretionary standard "simply because [they]
may prefer another interpretation of the statute").
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grounds of exclu~ion,2~
the latter ground being a matter that
implicates "the conduct of foreign relations" that is "so
exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as
to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.'"
The case also involves the application of the analytical
framework that the Supreme Court articulated in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, I~c." for
the interpretation of administrative statutes that mandates
agency deference in appropriate cases.
The Department of State (DOS), the executive branch
agency accorded documentation responsibilities under the INA
for such authority as the issuance of travel
gave the
s t a t u t e a n unnatural c o n s t r u ~ t i o n ~
t h~a t was not
contemplated by the Congress that drafted it.30The DOS
interpretation also ran counter to modern social concerns
evinced in international treaties and related statute^.^' The
statute was subsequently amended to ameliorate the earlier
25. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd per
curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
26. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (footnote omitted).
27. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
28. Ordinarily, the DOS's responsibilities lie in the field of foreign relations.
Nevertheless, it is one of five major federal agencies involved in the immigration
process. 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). Although it has a secondary role in administering
the immigration laws, compare 8 U.S.C. 8 1103(a) with id. $8 1104(a) and 1201,
the DOS plays a primary role in visa issuance because visa applications are
usually handled by consulate officials abroad. A foreign national intending to visit
this country must, therefore, Ne a visa application at a United States consulate or
embassy in his or her homeland before traveling to this country.
For a more complete description of the DOS's role in the issuance of
immigration visas, see generally T. ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF
& DAVIDA. MAI~TIN,
IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 115-17 (2d ed. 1991).
29. The construction of the provision in question was unnatural because a
literal definition of "activities" is far more restrictive than the connotations of
terms like "mere presence* or "entry" proffered by the government.
30. See Kenneth D. Greenwald, Comment, Abourezk v. Reagan: The Need for
Further Clarification and Reform of Alien Excludability Law, 77 GEO. L.J. 217, 227
(1988) (describing congressional intent behind the provision as unclear at best but
acknowledging that no evidence existed to indicate that Congress ever "directly
addressed" the issue in question).
31. See, e.g., Mitchell C. Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of Aliens: The Evolution
of a Policy, 2 GEO. IMMIGR.L.J. 1 (1987) (tracing the history of the ideological and
national interest exclusion provisions enacted in 1952 to the legislative and social
currents set in motion as early as the colonial period); Deborah L. Zimic, Note,
National Security Visa Denials: Delimiting the Exercise of Executive Exclusion
Authorib Under the Immigration and Nationalib Act, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 711 (1988)
(examining the proposed reform measures designed to conform the national security
exclusion grounds to address current political and social reality concerns); see also
infia notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
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interpretation. Admittedly, under several traditional and
modern methods of statutory interpretation, the agency
decision was not entirely justified. On the other hand, the
statutory language in question is very broad and sweeping in
scope, and the DOS acted in an area of broad executive
discretion pursuant to a statute designed to protect national
interests. Further, the agency's interpretation was
linguistically possible and not clearly precluded by the
statutory provision's legislative history or the subsequent
legislative history of a related provision. Finally, the DOS is
generally concerned with matters having foreign policy
implications."

A. Abourezk v. Reagan: Facts and Background
Abourezk v. Reagan involved the denial of visas t o four
foreign national^?^ Each foreign national had applied for a
visa at an American consulate or embassy abroad? The consular officers originally denied the visas on ideological grounds
to which a possible statutory waiver would have applied.35
But because all of the applications involved possible denials for
foreign policy reasons under the national interest (or national
security) ground of exclusion for which no waiver was possible,
they were forwarded to DOS officials in Washington, D.C. for
review in accordance with standing operational instr~ctions.~~
-

-

-

-

-

32. Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain
Meaning Of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 449
(1993).
33. The initial controversy involved the consolidation of three actions, contesting the DOS's denial under INA $ 212(a)(27) of nonimmigrant visas to four foreign
nationals whose names and affiliations appear in parentheses: Abourezk v. Reagan,
No. 83-3739 (Tomas Borge, Nicaragua's Minister of the Interior); City of New York
v. Baker, No. 83-3741 (Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodriguez Lezcano, members of the
Federation of Cuban Women); and Cronin v. Baker, No. 83-3895 (Nino Pasti, former member of the Italian Senate and participant in activities of the World Peace
Council). Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984).
34. With exceptions not relevant here, no alien may enter the United States
without first having applied for and obtained an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa.
See 8 U.S.C. $0 118l(a), 1182(aX26) (Supp. V 1993).
35. A discretionary waiver of excludability based on the ideological ground
(subsection 28) could have been conferred by the Attorney General, but no such
waiver was available for exclusion under the national interest ground (subsection
27). 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(d)(3) (1982).
36. "Applications for nonimmigrant visas do not typically raise foreign policy
concerns." Government's Brief at 6 31.2, Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
Between 1963 and 1983, consular officers issued nearly 70 million nonimmigrant
visas and denied (on foreign policy or internal security grounds) only 519 applica-
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Originally, three of the four denials were based on former
INA 5 212(a)(28)f7 ultimately, however, all four were based
on former INA 5 212(a)(27)?~ Subsection 28, generally referred to as the "ideological" ground, was more specific in scope,
and barred admission to aliens who advocated, or were members of organizations that advocated, anarchistic, communist,
or totalitarian ideology, or otherwise advocated the overthrow
~~
27, generally
of the United States g o ~ e r n m e n t .Subsection
labelled the "national interests" ground, broadly barred entry to
any alien who sought "to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be
prejudicial to the public interest or endanger the welfare,
safety or security of the United States.'"'
In each case, DOS officials in Washington recommended
the denial of the visas on the ground that admission would be
prejudicial to U.S. foreign policy interests. Specifically, DOS
concluded that the foreign nationals9visits to the United States
were not as private citizens of their respective countries but as
official representatives of their countries9 governments as part
of official efforts to disrupt American foreign policy, with the
exception of Nino Pasti whom the government considered to be
a n emissary of an instrumentality for the former Soviet govern-

tions under subsection 27. Id. During the period from 1981 through 1983, six to
seven million nonimmigrant visas had been granted annually and an average of
less than 30 were denied under subsection 27. Id. (citing statement of Joan M.
Clark, Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 198.3: Hearing on H.R. 4509 and
H.R. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refkgees, and International Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1984); BUREAUOF
CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, REPORTSOF THE VISA OFFICE (MS-1980, 1981, 1982)).
The DOS, however, provides special guidance to its consular officers whenever
visa applications raise national security or foreign policy concerns. Id. at 7. Such
cases must be referred to the Department for an advisory opinion. Furthermore,
advisory opinions are required when a consular officer has reason to believe that
an applicant may be ineligible under subsection 2l2(a)(27). Id. (citing 9 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGNAFFAIRSMANUAL, Pt. 11, $ 41.91(a)(27) (1975) [Foreign
Affairs Manual, vol. 9 (Visa TI-880, 1' 1 I)]).
37. INA, ch. 477, $ 212(aX28), 66 Stat. 163, 184-86 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(aX28) (1982)).
38. INA,ch. 477, $ 2l2(a)(27), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(a)(27) (1982)). Unlike section 212(a)(28) of the Act, the Attorney
General could not have waived section 212(a)(27) to permit their entry. 8 U.S.C.
$ 1182(d)(3) (1982).
39. See 8 U.S.C. 5 1182(aX28) (1982). Aliens who published, or belonged to
organizations that published, materials advocating viewpoints espoused by such
groups were also barred. Id.
40. 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(aX27) (1982).
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ment? Eventually, DOS officials informed the consular officers that the entry and the proposed activities of the aliens
would prejudice the conduct of United States foreign affairs,
and instructed that the visas be denied pursuant to subsection
27 for which no possible waiver existed.42The visa applicants
were informed of the denials accordingly, and lawsuits soon
followed.
The plaintiffs were a diverse group of individuals and organizations, including several members of Congress, who had
originally invited the foreign nationals-individuals with direct
or indirect ties to communist governments-to come to the
United States as speakers. The plaintiffs brought suit in their
own right43challenging the visa denials on grounds that the
DOS had improperly denied visas through an erroneous application of the statute and that the American plaintiffs' first
amendment right t o engage in dialogue with these foreign
nationals had been violated? Among other arguments,
plaintiffs contended that the activities they proposed to engage
in posed no danger to the public interest or the safety, security,
or welfare of the United States and that the statute itself did
not permit exclusion on the grounds that entry alone was prejudicial t o those interests.
The district court granted the government's request for
summary judg~nent.'~The plaintiffs then appealed to the
41. Government's Brief at 10, Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
42. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 881 (D.D.C. 1984).
43. The INA does not of itself endow plaintiffs with a right of action, but the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $$ 701-706 (1982), which complements statutes controlling agency behavior, does. Specifically, $ 702 affords a right of review
to "[a] person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or [who is] adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute." 5 U.S.C. $ 702 (1972). Although the government had argued in the district court that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing to challenge the visa
denials, the court concluded that qu]nquestionably, [plaintiffs were] 'aggrieved' by
the State Department's resort to section 1182(a)(27) [for which no waiver of
excludability was possible] to keep out people they have invited to engage in open
discourse with them within the United States . . . ." Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d
1043, 1050-51 (D.C. Cir. 1986), af'd per curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). Accordingly,
they were, as the district court observed, at least arguably within the zone regulated by the statute. Id. Not surprisingly, the Court of Appeals affwmed this conclusion. Id.
44. Although the district court had decided the first amendment issue on the
basis of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), the Court of Appeals considered this case as presenting special circumstances and that the court should proceed in a manner that avoided a constitutional confrontation. See Abourezk, 785
F.2d at 1049.
45. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that the
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which
reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. From that ruling, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Due to an evenly divided court, the Supreme Court affirmed the result reached in the Court of Appeals?
The statutory issues raised in the Court of Appeals addressed the meaning of former section 212(a)(27) of the INA.
The Court of Appeals considered whether section 212(a)(27)
permitted exclusion only when the alien sought entry into the
United States to engage in activities that the government determined would be prejudicial t o the national interest as the
plaintiffs had argued, or simply because the alien's mere presence here would be prejudicial t o the national interest, as the
government contended? In the district court, Judge Greene
had concluded that in the particular context of this case, the
distinction between an alien's activities and his or her mere
presence in the United States is one without a difference, citing
t o the 1979 incident involving the seizure of American hostages
in the U.S. embassy in Tehran following the entry of the Shah
of Iran into the United States." Of significant note, the legislative history accompanying the recently enacted, newly-crafted
"foreign policy" exclusion provision also cites to this particular
incident.

B. The Mandate of Chevron
Chevron U S A . , Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
~ n c . ~controls
'
the judicial review process in cases such as
Abourezk involving an agency's interpretation of a statute . The

specific visa denials were within the DOS's statutory and constitutional authority),
rev'd 785 F.2d 1043 0.C. Cir. 1986) (on statutory grounds only and remanded concluding that material issues of fad remained to be resolved in the district court),
af'd per curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
46. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) aff'd per curium, 484
U.S. 1 (1987).
47. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1053.
48. Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. at 884-85. Judge Harold H. Greene, in reaching
his conclusion, observed that the best proof of the government's position here was
the case of the former Shah of Iran whose mere entry into the United States provoked the 1979 American Hostages incident in Tehran. As Judge Greene further
observed: Given these most serious consequences for the United States resulting
from the Shah's admission, "[ilt is thus not surprising that the Executive, in construing subsection (27)' has not made the distinction plaintas ask the Court to
draw." Id. at 884.
49. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Court in Chevron assembled an analytical framework-albeit a
rickety one-for assessing the validity of an administrative
agency's construction of the statute that the agency is charged
The Court established a two-step apwith admini~tering.~~
proach t o analyze the interpretive issue presented to a reviewing court. First, "[ilf the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of ConBut if a court determines that Congress has not digre~s."~'
rectly addressed the precise question at issue, it may not substitute its own construction of the statute, as would be the case
"Rather,
in the absence of an administrative interpretati~n.~~
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute."53In other words, the principle of deference to reasonable administrative interpretations applies where congressional intent is not
clearly expressed on the precise question at issue.54 Such is
the case here. And "clear evidence of interpretive intent . . . is
a rarity."55
The judges in Abourezk ostensibly followed the guidance
offered by the criteria set forth in Chevron. Although Chevron
favors deference," it does not eliminate statutory interpretation; it merely disguises it.57Terms like "unambiguous mandate" and "permissible interpretation" are elastic enough to
permit a judge to build what she will out of the language.
50. Stephen M. Lynch, Note, A Framework For Judicial Review of An
Agency's Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985 Duke L.J. 469, 470.
51. Chevron, 467 U S . at 842-43.
52. Id. at 843.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Diver, supra note 1, a t 570.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594
(1992) (stating that Chevron announced a "fundamental principle of our law, one
requiring judicial deference to a reasonable statutory interpretation by an administering agency"). But cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U S . 421 (1987) (demonstrating that the deference principle does not necessarily apply in every case involving
an agency construction of a broad or ambiguously expressed statutory provision).
57. As one legal commentator has suggested, "Chevron's limitation of the
federal courts' interpretive authority is properly understood as a self-imposed restriction, born of prudence, rather than a constitutional or statutory imperative."
Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 1991 WH. L. REV.1275, 1275.
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Chevron itself, in other words, does not provide-except in the
easiest of cases-the judge with workable guidance.
Nevertheless, the first task for the judge is to interpret the
statute t o determine whether there has been an unambiguous
mandate. If not, the judge is to apply to the agency's construction of the statutory provision in question some standards of
interpretation to determine whether the agency decision was a
permissible, t o wit, "reasonable" interpretation. Chevron counsels judges to employ the traditional tools of statutory interpretation in resolving the first prong of the mandate.58 These
tools involve the text, the context including legislative history,
subsequent events and policy grounds. Each of these elements
tends to carry with it a theory that depends on that element
alone, and each such theory is inadequate t o the extent it ignores the other considerations. This is particularly so in the
application of the "plain meaning" rule.
C. The Text of Subsection 27 and the "PlainMeaning" Rule
The statutory language supports the view that exclusion
cannot be based on the effect of entry alone, since it refers t o
"engaging" in "activities" and no reference to mere physical
presence appears in the text. Further, as the majority in
Abourezk pointed out, other subsections of the statute specifically designate whether the exclusion is based on status or on
activities. This reinforces a reading of the language which permits exclusion under subsection 27 only for "activities." Judge
Ginsburg then stated, "[tlhe language of the statute, as the
Dissent acknowledges, supports the plaintiffs' interpretation on
this issue."5g Former Judge Bork in dissent admitted, "[hlad
we before us nothing but the language of the statute, without
any legislative history, I might be inclined to adopt the construction proposed by the plaintifkW0
The plain meaning rule thus restricts a court to the literal
Extrinsic
'
evidence can
meaning of the words of the s t a t ~ t e . ~
58. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Comm'l Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112,
123 (1987) (observing that the first prong of the Chevron test, i.e., determining
congressional intent, is purely a legal question to be guided by "traditional tools of
statutory construction").
59. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
60. Id. at 1066.
61. The plain meaning rule has been around for some time now. As the debate surrounding the various approaches to statutory interpretation heats up in the
wake of Chevron, it has been labelled one of the elements in a new interpretive
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be considered only if the statutory language is unclear or ambiguous. Application of the plain meaning rule would dictate
the adoption of the plaintiffs' construction of the statutory
terms. Presumably, if that were the end of the inquiry, the
agency's construction would be patently "unreasonable" and
thus fail. But none of the opinions rendered in the
case--district or appellate-rested their conclusions on the
express statutory language. In other words, none of the judges
relied upon a literal interpretation or plain meaning of the
statutory language.
Once prominent in decisional law, the plain meaning rule
has long been out of favor among academics.62The Supreme
Court apparently abandoned it as well years ago, but, astonishingly, resurrected it quite
particularly in the
context of immigration law.64The usual rationale for the plain
meaning approach is that, as Justice Scalia has said, "Ijludges
interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intent i o n ~ . "Several
~~
reasons exist for not "reconstructing" those
"intentions": First, the plain meaning-that is, the interpretation given by a reasonable person reading only the statute-is
more accessible and the statute is more likely to be read consistently (in other words, without the clutter of the legislative
history).66Second, a plain meaning approach is also said t o
approach called "textualism." Mashaw, supra note 3, at 829 (citing William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990)); see also, Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The 'New* New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO
L. REV. 1597, 1597-98 (1991) (noting Prof. Eskridge's characterizing Justice Scalia's approach as the "new textualism").
62. See, e.g., Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introduction to
Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38 U. KAN. L.
REV. 815, 818 (1990). See generally W. REYNOLDS,
JUDICIAL
PROCESSIN A NUTSHELL 206-12 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the application of the plain meaning rule
more as a rule concerning what evidence to consider rather than an interpretive
approach).
63. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41
(1989) ("[Als long as the statutory scheme is coherent and amistent, there generally is no need for a court t o inquire beyond the plain language of the statute.").
Justice Scalia has been a leader in the renascence of the plain meaning rule. See,
e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J. concurring)
("[Ilf the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effedcat
least in the absence of a patent absurdity."). Judge Easterbrook also endorses the
plain meaning rule. See Easterbrook, supm note 3, at 65.
64. See, e.g., INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984) (adopting a literal interpretation of the term "continuous physical presence" which was even contrary to
the government's construction of the statutory provision).
65. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452-53.
66. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 66.
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"discipline" the legislature, to penalize it when the intent has
not been made evident in the statutory language. Finally, a
more sophisticated argument suggests that because most legislation results from the desire of individual legislators to be reelected rather than from a desire to serve the public good, a
limiting form of construction--such as plain meaning-is an
effective form of damage control.B7
The standard critique of the plain meaning rule is that it is
simplistic in its approach to language, for it assumes that lam
guage can be understood outside of context.68Another objection is that it strongly inhibits the ability of the legislature to
pass a statute which can be adapted to changing or unanticipated circumstances-hence its appeal to non-activist judge ~Finally,
. ~ a~ plain meaning advocate is at a loss when the
language is found not plain. There is no accompanying systematic method of looking at legislative history. This is not mere
quibbling; in the absence of a principled approach to an interpretive question, the search through extrinsic evidence becomes
merely ad hoe.
In Abourezk, the government argued that the language was
susceptible t o an interpretation which would make "entry"
sufficient grounds for exclusion. Judge Bork agreed: "[Ilt is not
at all clear-from the language alone-whether presence within
Individuals
this country can itself be deemed an 'a~tivity.'"~~
in this country are always engaging in some activity, even if it
is just sleeping. If an alien's presence is prejudicial to the national interest or security, her activity is prejudicial because
she must be present to engage in it. Although this is a possible
interpretation, it is a strained one. A reasonable person would
not ordinarily think that an alien who seeks to enter the United States to go skiing at Aspen was seeking to enter the country "to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the
67. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 20, 27-28 (1988). This last reason highlights what may be the real
reason for renewed judicial interest in plain meaning. It serves admirably the purpose of conservative judges who wish to restrict the range of liberal legislation. Cf.
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in
the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982). It is no surprise, therefore, that
jurists like Scalia and Easterbrook have become zealous advocates of the rule.
Abourezk, however, demonstrates the potential of plain meaning to cut the other
way-limiting the scope of restrictive laws as well.
68. See, e.g., REYNOLDS,
supra note 62, at 192-93.
69. REYNOLDS,
supra note 62, at 211.
70. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1066 (D.C.Cir. 1986).
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public interest or endanger the welfare, safety or security of
the United States." Nevertheless, no word can be understood
out of its context. Read without regard to context, the statutory
language seems to deal only with concern for activities and not
with presence. If, however, the language is approached with
the expectation that it authorizes exclusion where entry would
be prejudicial, the words will bear that meaning. Thus, the
existence of ambiguity depends upon some concern beyond the
words on the page.
Justice Scalia, in Cardoza-Fonseca," made abundantly
clear that legislative history wqs never relevant in the administrative ont text.'^ If there is ambiguity, the agency's view wins.
This case illustrates the problem of determining ambiguity. All
words have meaning dependant on context. In the absence of
any other context, the reader may assume a context inferred
from the language and conclude that the meaning is plain. If
that context is shown to be inaccurate, the meaning may no
longer be plain. Discovery of ambiguity requires some attention
to the surrounding circumstances. Hence, even a plain meaning
court should turn to legislative history to put the language in
context. But the plain meaning court rejects such guidance.
Advocates of the plain meaning rule do not get to the legislative history until they find that the statute on its face is ambiguous.
OF SUBSECTION
27: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
111. THECONTEXT
AND ORIGINAL
INTENT-THE DECEPTION
OF THE DISSENT

The legislative history of former INA 5 212(a)(27) is rich
and instructive for those who believe that it is relevant to
problems of statutory interpretation.73 Anyone, in other
words, who is interested in the questions of legislative intent o r

71. 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Judges interpret laws
rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the language of those laws is
clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.").
72. See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 62, at 847 ("Justice Scalia has excoriated
legislative histories suggesting that they be held inadmissible.") In fact, Justice
Scalia is considered to be the "high priest" of the new textualism, exalting statutory text over other extrinsic sources of statutory meaning. Mashaw, supra note 3, at
835.
73. See, e.g., James M. Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV.
L. REV. 886, 887-88 (1930) (noting that the language of the statute, legislative
history, and statutory purpose often provides rich and compelling evidence of congressional intent).
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purpose will find much ore to mine in this material. The question for those persons is what they do with what they find."

A. Legislative History
Section 212(a)(27) enacted in 1952, traces its lineage t o
laws passed in 1950, 1948, and 1941. This trail leads the student through fascinating chapters in United States history
when the threat of fascist and communist subversion seemed
especially vivid t o Congress. Section 212(a)(27) along with secoriginal ground of exclusion in this
tion 212(a)(28)-the
case-embody Congress's attempt to deal with this problem.
Ever since their adoption, controversy has surrounded
these exclusion grounds. Although used less frequently than
they were immediately after their passage, they remained immune t o reform effortsv5and a part of the law only until fairly
recently.76These grounds reflect a period in American history
characterized by anticommunist hysteria, one which led to the
passage of "xenophobic legi~lation."'~
The antecedents of section 212(a)(27) date t o the early part
of this century.78 The provision relating to anarchists was
adopted by Congress in 1903 in the wake of President
McKinley's assassination, and supplemented by the Anarchist
Act of 1918, which was applied broadly t o cover communists as
well as other political s undesirable^."^^ Sanctions against
74. While quoting Judge Leventhal's observation about the use of legislative
materials, Judge Wald of the Distrid of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that the use of legislative history is similar to "looking over a crowd and picking
out your friends." Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the. Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWAL. REV. 195, 214 (1982). This is
no less true about the decision-making process in Abourezk.
75. See ALEINKOFF& MAR!~'IN,IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY183 (1st ed.
1985) (noting that "[elven the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy, which carried out an otherwise comprehensive study of immigration laws
from 1978 through 1981, ducked the thorny political controversies that might be
involved in recasting the grounds of exclusion").
76. See H.R. REP. No. 955, 101 Cong., 2d Sess. 128-31 (1990).
77. Carlos 0. Miranda, Rethinking the Role of Politics in United States Immigration Law: The Helsinki Accords and Ideological Exclusion of Aliens, 25 SAN
DIEGOL. REV.301, 319 (1988).
78. See generally Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, Grounds for Exclusion of Aliens Under The Immigration And Nationality Ad, Serial No. 7 at 5-27 (1988).
79. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, $5 2, 38, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214, 1221 and
the Anarchist A d of October 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012. See also E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISI~ATIVE
H I ~ R OYF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY1798-1965, at 42327 (1981).
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aliens who had engaged in activities considered subversive
were enhanced by the Smith Act of 1940.80
In 1941, six months before Pearl Harbor, Congress passed
another act which barred issuance of visas to aliens who sought
entry t o engage in activities deemed an endangerment to the
public safety of this ~ountry.~'
The 1941 Act was not part of
the Immigration Act. However, the concept of excluding aliens
who were expected to endanger the public safety found its way
The 1948 enactment was
into the Act of May 25, 1948.~~
passed a t the beginning of the post-war "Red Scare." Finally, in
1950, Congress enacted the Internal Security Acti-originally
sponsored by the House Un-American Activities Committee-which
contained, in almost identical language, the
exclusionary bars carried over into sections 212(aX27) and (28)
which Congress adopted in 1952 during the Cold War years as
part of the thirty-three grounds for exclusion of the McCarranWalter
A closer look at the individual enactments highlights the
sloppy use of the provision's legislative history by both the
majority and dissent in Abourezk. Much of the difEculty arises
from legislators' use of sweeping language in a casual manner
t o describe technical language. If an alien intends to engage in
activities dangerous to the national safety, her presence in this
country is dangerous to the national safety. A law which excludes her because of the likelihood that she will engage in
such activities, therefore, may be described as a law that keeps
out persons whose presence is dangerous t o the national safety,
even though it does not exclude all persons who present such a
danger.
For example, the law passed in 1941 uses the term "activities" to describe the exclusionary bar to admission-a clear
antecedent t o the present ground.s4 The Senate Report stated
80. Alien Registration Act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 670 is commonly referred to as the Smith Act.
81. A d of June 20, 1941, ch. 209, 55 Stat. 252, supplemented the 1918 Act.
82. Act of May 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-552, 62 Stat. 268, repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, $ 403(a)(48), 66 Stat. 279, 280.
83. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, Title I, 8 22, 64 Stat. 987, 1006.
84. In pertinent part, it reads:
That whenever any American diplomatic or consular officer knows or
has reason to believe that any alien seeks to enter the United States for
the purpose of engaging in activities which will endanger the public safety of the United States, he shall refuse to issue to such alien any immigration visa, passport visa, transit certificate, or other document entitling
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i n its purpose paragraph, however, that the bill was to keep
out "certain aliens, otherwise admissible, whose presence i n the
United States would be dangerous to the public safety."85 Further, a letter from the Attorney General and one from the Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Immigration also referred briefly to the fact that the bill
would prohibit the "entry" or the "admission" of certain aliens
into the United States?
Judge Bork's dissent in Abourezk quoted these references
and noted that the Committee Chairman, on the Senate floor,
also referred to the bill as denying visas to those whose "presence" would be "inimical to the public interest."' Bork concluded from this that Congress understood the term "activities"
to encompass entry and presen~e.'~
Judge Ginsburg, who cited
no legislative history on this point, merely stated that the majority did not find the legislative history of the 1941 Act to be
as clear as the dissent found it?'
To add to the confusion over the meaning of these terms,
the letter to the Senate Committee Chairman on Immigration
from the Attorney General also described the bill in another
way, namely, that a visa shall be denied when a n "alien wishes
to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in activities which would endanger the public safety."g0 This passage,
admittedly, quotes the key language of the bill. However, it
redirects our attention to "activities" as the condition precedent
for a n alien to be denied admission into the United States.
Whether Bork's references to the bill's content should be
taken, as Ginsburg stated, "as drafted more meticulously and
as reflecting congressional will more accurately than the statutory text itself,"'' is a central issue throughout Bork's analysis. The scope of the bill is so short and so easily grasped by a
quick reading that accurate statements about its content would
have to repeat word for word the language of the bill. This sug-

such alien to present himself for admission into the United States.
A d of June 20, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-113, 55 Stat. 252, repealed by Immigration
and Nationality A d of 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(43).
85. S. REP. NO. 386, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1941) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 1-2.
87. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
88. Id. at 1066.
89. Id. at 1054-55 a l l .
90. S. REP. NO. 386, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1941).
91. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1054 a l l .
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gests that the references Bork cited may have been casual
comments. Thus, Bork's analysis of the legislative history is, a t
best, overstatedeg2
More persuasive that the Senate committee chairman's
comments were casual references is the evidence of his errors
in describing the bill. Although the bill concerned activities
that endanger the "public safety," the chairman said it concerned the endangerment of "public interest." It seems unlikely
that those two terms are synonymous because one is a good
deal more narrow in scope than the other. If the chairman
erred about the very nature of the bill, additional errors are all
too possible. Bork's analysis, therefore, loses some ground here.
The 1948 amendment tracked the language of the 1941
Act, and also involved the Attorney General in decisions to
admit or exclude aliens. The amendment provided that "aliens
who the Attorney General knows or has reason t o believe seek
to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in activities which will endanger the public safety of the United States"
shall be excluded.g3The significance of the amendment to the
Abourezk case is not easily overstated because this provision
eventually emerged as 8 U.S.C. 8 1182(a)(27). Obviously, the
legislative history of the 1948 Amendment should have been
considered in Abourezk, yet both judges ignored it in their
opinions.
The Senate and House reports, which duplicate one another, provide interesting insight. Each states that Congress
amended "the immigration laws t o deny admission t o the United States of persons who may be coming here for the purpose of
engaging in activities which will endanger the public safety . . . ."94 Each then refers t o a letter from the Assistant Attorney General that "so completely described [the bill] . . . that
further discussion is u ~ e c e s s a r y . "The
~ ~ letter also refers t o
the term "acti~ities.'~~

92. Also, as discussed more fully below, selective reliance on legislative history materials could masquerade for judicial candor or a lack thereof.
93. Act of May 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-552, 62 Stat. 268, repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(48), 66 Stat. 279, 280.
94. H.R.REP.NO. 1286, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948).
95. Id. at 1-2.
96. In pertinent part the letter reads:
Under existing law (22 U.S.C. 9 228), whenever an American diplomat or
consular officer knows or has reason to believe that an alien seeks to
enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in activities that will
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All of these sources support the view that Congress intended the amendment to exclude aliens on the basis of contemplated activity in the United States, but not for prejudicial entry as
Judge Bork would have it. The Attorney General's letter is
most instructive on this point for it states that the bill is designed to correct the problem of concealment of purpose which
could lead to a lawful admission. The intent to engage in activities can be concealed, but when an alien requests a visa, there
is no concealment, nor can there be, of an intent to enter the
United States.
The purpose of t h e Internal Security Act of
1950-according t o the Senate report-was to strengthen existing law regarding the exclusion and deportation of subversive
aliens.97The House Un-American Activities Committee, which
originally sponsored the bill, however, was primarily concerned
with the "enemy within," i.e., communist activities in the United States." It was the Senate, however, that undertook a revision of the Immigration Act and redrafted the language that
became section 212(a)(27).~' The final draft of the Internal
Security Act blended the concerns of both Houses of Congress.
Although the House report concerning the original bill,
which was later amended, suggests that the House was focused
on the acts of subversives and not the mere entry of certain
individual^,'^^ the apparent focus on activities per se must be

endanger the public safety, he must refuse to issue to such alien an immigration visa or any other document entitling the alien to present himself for admission into the country. However, if the alien succeeds in
concealing such purpose from the diplomatic or consular officer and obtains a visa or other travel document, he cannot legally be denied admission on the ground of his [sic] purpose after he reaches the United
States.
The bill under consideration would correct this . . . .
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
97. S. REP. NO. 2230, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
98. See H.R. REP. NO. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3886.
99. H.R. COW. REP. NO. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3886, 3899-900, 1001.
100. The House Report states:
[W]e contend that, under our constitutional system, ideas must be combated with ideas and not with legislation. If communism in the United
States operated in the open, without foreign direction, and without attempting to set up a dictatorship subservient to a foreign power, legislation directed against it would neither be justified nor necessary.

***
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considered in another light. The original House bill was not
directed at aliens but at United States citizens who may have
been attempting to subvert the government. Thus, the House
report does not shed much light on congressional thinking
regarding the admission of aliens, except to suggest that activities, not mere presence, was on the collective mind of the
House.
The Senate, which sponsored the revision of the Immigration Act, reworked and added language to the 1948 amendment
t o exclude from admission "[alliens who seek to enter the United States whether solely, principally, or incidentally, to engage
in activities which would be prejudicial t o the public interest,
or would endanger the welfare or safety of the United
States."lol Three changes in the 1948 amendment resulted
from this new language: (1) elimination of the reference t o the
Attorney General (this was inserted in another subsection); (2)
clarification that any intent to engage in certain acts, no matter how slight, is sufficient grounds t o exclude; and (3) broadening of the list of forbidden conduct to include those activities
which are prejudicial t o the public interest or which endanger
public safety.
Commenting on the changes, the Senate report, which
noted that the subsection was a mix of new and existing law,
reintroduced ambiguity when it stated that "under existing
law, among the excludable aliens are certain aliens who seek to
enter the United States whose entry would be prejudicial to the
public interest or would endanger the safety of the United
States."lo2The Report also stated that the class of excludable
aliens was broadened "to include those aliens who seek to enter
the United States to engage in activities which would endanger
the welfare of the United States."lo3
Both Ginsburg and Bork quote this passage as illustrating
that Congress viewed the law as prohibiting prejudicial en-

There is irrefutable evidence to support the premise that the Communist
organization is now and has been, since its inception, engaged in the
training of espionage specialists who are taught to infiltrate and destroy
our Government from within.
H.R. REP. NO. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3886,
3888, 3891.
101. S. REP.NO. 2230, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950).
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id.
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try.la" The problem with this passage, however, is that its author misstated the law. Existing law, as shown above, did not
exclude when entry would be prejudicial but only when entry
endangered public safety. Having made this error, the author
goes on to misinform the reader that the new provision merely
adds an exclusion for activities prejudicial t o the public interest.
Given that the passage is misleading and incorrect on
these two points, its credibility as evidence of congressional
intent must be reconsidered; if the author is wrong in describing these provisions, why should he be assumed correct on
another point of law mentioned in the same passage?'"
Moreover, the author's reference to "existing lad' was a direct
reference t o the 1948 amendment and, as seen earlier, the
legislative record strongly suggests that Congress in 1948 intended exclusion t o be based only on activities, and not on
prejudicial entry.
Other passages in the record, not mentioned in Abourezk,
support this interpretation. In discussing the history of the
immigration statutes, the Senate report in several different
places paraphrases the 1948 amendment and the 1941 law as
excluding aliens who seek admission "for the purpose of engaging in activities."'" The terms "presence" or "entry," used in
the manner Bork suggests are never mentioned. The period in
which these measures were enacted also lend credence t o the
notion that the prime concern was with an alien's activities
while in this country.
The Walter-McCarran Act incorporated the above provisions of the Internal Security Act into what became the now
former section 212(a)(27) of the INA. There were only two
changes to that subsection: (1)reinsertion of the express reference t o the powers of the Attorney General, along with consular officers, to exclude aliens when they have knowledge of
certain facts; and (2) addition of activities that endanger "security" to the list of activities for which exclusion is possible. The
subsection required exclusion of aliens "the consular officer or
104. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054 n.9, 1064-65 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
105. Of course, there is always the hypothesis that the author deliberately
misstated the content of existing law. Two objections can be made to that point:
first, what end would be served by a deliberate misstatement? Second, statutory
construction would indeed be an endless quagmire if the good faith of relevant
statements were open to question.
106. S. REP.NO. 2230, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, 23-24 (1950).
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the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe seek to
engage in activities that would be prejudicial t o the public
interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the
United States."'" Unfortunately, references t o this subsection
in the legislative record are almost nonexistent.
The most substantive comment is found in a discussion
about the law as it relates t o the examination of aliens before
an immigration officer. The Senate Report notes, in passing,
that such an examination may give rise t o exclusion under
section 212(a)(27) for "an alien whose entry would endanger the
Bork notes this passage as anpublic safety or se~urity."'~~
other example that prejudicial entry was encompassed by subsection 27.1°9 Since the author's focus is on another section of
the bill, this is not persuasive evidence of such intent.
The majority's search of the legislative history is anything
but exhaustive. While a few passages quoted in the opinion do
support a view that the legislative history is ambiguous with
regard to the interpretation of subsection 27, many other passages could have been cited by the majority which would tip
the balance in favor of the plaintiffs9interpretation that prejudicial entry was not a sufficient ground to exclude aliens.
Judge Bork's research is far more thorough; nonetheless,
one must conclude that he was either not very careful in his
research or very selective in what he used. If the latter is an
accurate characterization then Bork has engaged in the tactics
of an advocate and not the role of a judge resolving the issue in
accordance with established rules.
Judge Bork's determination is, essentially, premised on a
series of brief, casual references-almost asides-that occasionally break through the surface of the legislative record. Substantive comments such as that found in the record of the 1948
amendment are entirely ignored; yet that record is certainly
relevant to most theories of the proper interpretation of the
statute. Moreover, the references selected by Judge Bork contain misstatements or errors which lessen their reliability as
evidence of legislative intent.

107. 8 U.S.C. 8 1182(a)(27) (1988).
108. S. REP. NO. 1137, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1952).
109. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1065.
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B. Original Intent
The orthodox approach to statutory interpretation treats
statutes as static texts.'1° Legislative intent is the criterion
that is most often cited when interpreting the meaning of statutes. According to Professor Eskridge, this "intentionalist"
approach asks how the legislature originally intended the interpretive question to be answered, or would have intended the
question to be answered had it thought about the issue when it
passed the statute."'
This "originalist" approach assumes that the legislature
fnes the meaning of a statute to all possible applications the
day it was enacted.ll2 The implicit claim is that a legislator
interpreting the statute at the time of enactment would render
the same interpretation as a judge interpreting the same statute f a y years later. This implication seems counterintuitive.
Indeed, the legal realists argued this point earlier in the century.'13 All statutes contain gaps and ambiguities. They exist
because the legislature has failed to anticipate them or has
used broad and sweeping language, hence, no clear intent is
discernable.
The method of statutory interpretation courts most often
invoke is t o discover legislative or "original" intent.'14 Of
course the intention of the legislatures multi-member body of
politicians-is not easily discoverable, especially when a complicated statute is in~olved.''~Thus, it is difficult to conclude,
as did Judge Bork, that the legislative history clearly supported
the government's interpretive view. The record shows a conscious concern t o exclude aliens who might do something within the United States that was harmful, but seemingly no consideration was given to the application of this provision t o
persons whose entry alone might be harmful. Judge Ginsburg
for the majority gave Judge Bork's version of legislative history
entirely too much credit when she cited the Senate Reports as
being in favor of allowing exclusion for prejudicial entry, but
she was correct when she noted, "[olne searches all the legisla-

110. For general explanation of the intentionalist approach, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
111. Id. at 1480 n.3.
112. Aleinikoff, supra note 67, at 22.
113. REYNOLDS,
supra note 62, at 184-85.
114. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 869 (1930).
115. Id. at 870.
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tive history in vain for an illustration homing in on the question at issue."116In short, there is a clear original intent concerning exclusion for activities and none concerning exclusion
for presence. Faced with such a gap, the original intent theorist
has no basis for determining what the drafters would have
done. Since the language points away from application based
on entry and the legislature did not consider its application to
entrance which causes harm, the original intent theorist should
not find the statute applicable.

C. The Legal Process School
To a legal process follower, as already noted above, the
legislative history is rich in material."'
A "modified
intentionalist" or legal process approach uses original purpose
rather than original intent, as the focus for interpretation.l18
Legal process followers seek the interpretation that best furthers the purpose the original legislature had in mind when it
enacted the statute.'lg The legal process theorist thus searches for the context more intensely than the original intent theorist. The purpose is derived by analysis of the problem which
the statute was designed to address and the interests which
bound its solution. The difficulty with this theory lies in identifying the "purpose" of the statute. According t o Professor Cass
Sunstein, that purpose is not discovered but created.lzORecognition of the difficulty in ascertaining the original intent o r
purpose has animated the debate on statutory interpretation
and prompted scholarly challenges t o the usual approach which
focuses a resolution of interpretive issues on traditional theories of statutory interpretation.12'

116. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
IN THE
117. See H. HART& A. SACKS,THE LEGALPROCESS:BASIC PROBLEMS
MARING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 1150-57 (tentative ed. 1958). The Hart and
Sacks approach, also referred to as the legal process" approach, follows the traditional search for legislative history through the text, legislative history and purpose. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 353-54.
118. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power:
The Case for A Modikd Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (defending the originalkt model of statutory interpretation and offering a modified
intentionalist approach).
119. See Eskridge, supra note 110, at 1480.
120. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HAW.
L. REV.405, 427 (1989) (noting that "[tlhe characterization of legislative purpose is
an act of creation rather than discovery").
121. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 356-57.
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As for the interpretive issue presented in Abourezk, subsection 27 was obviously designed to cope with the specific problem of aliens who were likely to engage in activities in the
United States that would be prejudicial to the public interest or
dangerous t o public welfare and safety. While that purpose
might be generalized to the level of protecting the national
interests of the United States, such a generalized purpose permits almost anything since it lies behind most immigration
statutes. A more specific purpose might be found in protection
of the nation from dangerous activities within its borders, a
limited purpose that would deny the agency's interpretation in
this case. And ascertaining the 1952 legislature's original intent would be htile because it seems more likely than not that
the precise statutory interpretation issue raised here was not
considered at the time of the INKS enactment.lP Thus, imagination and creativity may be necessary in the judicial process
of determining the specific statutory interpretation issue.
D. Originalism: Of Economists and Sailors
One of the early scholarly participants in this interpretive
discourse, Judge Richard A. Posner,lB has urged greater
Judge Posner's approach
study of statutory inter~retati0n.l~~
to statutory construction, which is closely aligned t o the legal
process school, is best described as one of "imaginative reconAccording to Judge Posner, the judge should try
stru~tion."'~~
to think her way, as best she can, into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the
statute applied t o the case at bar? It is easy t o scoff at this
122. As observed by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, "[olriginal intent controls, if
only we can find it." Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 60 (footnote omitted).
123. Judge Posner is a jurist who is famous for his economic analysis of the
law. Robert S. Summers, Jurisprudence and Political Theory: Judge Richard
Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1302, 1302 (1991); see RICHARDA.
POSNER,ECONOMIC
ANALYSISOF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
124. See RICHARD
A. POSNER,THE FEDERALCOURTS:CRISISAND REFORM33640 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U . CHI. L. REV. 800, 800-05 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Economics,
Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and t h Constitution, 49 U . CHI. L. REV. 263
(1982) (discussing the impad of an economic theory of legislation on how judges
"interpret legislative provisions, both statutory and constitutional").
125. Although his suggested approach closely resembles that of legal process
adherents, Judge Posner distinguishes his method by challenging the legal process
view that statutory purpose can guide the court's interpretive determination.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 124, at 819-20.
126. "The true law, the governing rule, is not down on paper; it is in the

1391

NATURE OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

165

approach. Judges dter all, lack the requisite imagination for
the most part and what they will do in practice is assume that
the legislators were people just like themselves; the interpretive process then will consist of judges voting for their own personal preferences and ascribing them to the statute's drafters.
But Judge Posner insists that if one assumes a judge who will
try, with the aid of a reasonable intelligence, to put herself in
the place of the enacting legislators, then she will do better if
she follows the suggested approach than if she tries t o apply
the canons of statutory interpretation.
If Judge Posner's approach had been followed in Abourezk,
the conclusion would have been that at the time of enactment,
the legislators would have wanted the agency's interpretation
t o be applied. After all, the Congress that enacted these exclusion provisions in 1952 had every intention to keep out aliens
for decidedly political reasons, an intention that President
Truman considered objectionable enough for him to veto the
bill when it was first submitted t o him for signature.12' The
override of that veto by two-thirds majorities in both houses of
Congress certainly evidenced congressional intent with respect
t o these provisions, and the weakly-worded McGovern Amendment, discussed more f d y below, does little to mitigate the effect of the original congressional action?
An imaginative reconstruction of the statute essentially requires a court to say that a frightened and timid legislature
would have wanted to pervert the language of their own statute to reach any situation that might be thought undesirable-a sort of delegation by fear that seems the antithesis of
statutory interpretation. One might equally well imagine the
initial legislator saying that the problem of "prejudicial entry"
must be dealt with through another statute since it was a conminds of the legislators." Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 60-61.
127. 98 CONG.REC. 8082, 8084 (1952) (veto message of Pres. Truman, June
25, 1952).
128. As reported by the Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1985:
As President Truman warned, "[s]eldom has a bill exhibited the distrust evidenced here for citizens and aliens alike." [footnote omitted.] On
their face, then, the ideological exclusion provisions conflict with the traditional values of the United States. In practice, the law is an unabashedly
cynical betrayal of those proclaimed beliefs.
Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Visa Denials on Ideological Grounds: An Update, 8 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 253 (1985) [hereinafter Visa Denials].
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cern she had never previously considered. Indeed, a less timid
legislature in 1990 did exactly that, to wit, enacted an entirely
new provision to address the problem.lzg
Judge Posner's "imaginative reconstruction" approach is in
sharp contrast t o the one advanced by Professor Alexander
Aleinikoff which also utilizes originalist sources.130 While
Judge Posner looks to the past much like an archeologist, Professor Aleinikoff offers a prescription for the present-minded.
The approach sketched out by Professor Aleinikoff is known as
the "nautical" approach t o statutory interpretation: "A statute
is an ongoing process in which both the shipbuilder and the
subsequent navigator play a role. The dimensions and structure of the craft determine where it is capable of going, but the
current course is set by the crew on board."131 Such an approach thus takes into account current values. This approach
urges judges to apply the traditional tools of originalist theorists in a "present-minded way."'"
The nature of judicial process would seem t o support a
more "present-minded" approach t o solving interpretive problems. Perhaps unconsciously, judges already engage in updating statutes while professing t o follow traditional approaches.
As Professor Nicholas Zeppos has observed: "Try as they might,
judges cannot completely place themselves outside the context
in which [the process of] statutory interpretation occur^."'^
Even Judge Posner in recent years has become more skeptical
about a judge's ability to place herself in a mindset associated
with the past? But it is unlikely that he would adopt an approach to statutory interpretation that expands the process
past the outer perimeter of traditional judicial conduct and
129. See infia notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
130. See Zeppos, supm note 14, at 356 n.18 (noting that Judge Posner's suggested approach has been "challenged as both unworkable and unresponsive to
democratic values").
131. Aleinikoff, supra note 67, at 20. The nautical approach is in keeping with
the more modern, evolutive approaches advanced by others, but examines it from a
different perspective. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 358. According to Professor Zeppos,
the nautical approach-although it challenges the legitimacy of the originalist apnonetheless, "be consistent with the
proach to statutory interpretation-may,
originalist framework that continues to dominate judicial opinions." Id. at 358 n.26.
132. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 411.
133. Id. at 411.
134. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skpticism, 86 MICH.
L. REV.
827, 849-51(1988) (conceding that imaginative reconstruction of legislative intent of
a past legislature may fail because of the present-minded context in which the
interpreter undertakes the interpretive task).

1391

NATURE OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

167

engages, in effect, in judicial legislation. Such, arguably, is the
potential end result of an evolutionary or more dynamic approach to deciding interpretive questions in the administrative
context.

IV. EVOLUTIVE
THEORIES
OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION:
SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS-THE
IRRELEVANCE
OF THE MAJORITY

If the legislative history is so insufficient as to preclude a
determination of ambiguity, another avenue of pursuit of the
meaning of a statute would be to interpret it dynamically, as
several legal commentators have ~uggested.''~ For some
scholars, doubts about the proper construction of a statute are
resolved not just by looking at language, history, and context;
later developments should also play a role. Thus, in contrast t o
an archeological approach, dynamic theorists ask how a particular statute can be read t o meet the needs of present-day society.'''
This approach is appealing because it is realistic in the
present-minded sense. "Gaps and ambiguities exist in all statutes, typically concerning matters as to which there was little
legislative deliberation."'" Such is the situation in Abourezk.
For dynamic theorists, "the quest is not properly for the sense
originally intended by the statute, [or] for the sense sought
originally t o be put into it, but rather for the sense which can
be quarried out of it in the light of the new ~ituation."'~
Thus, the interpretive approach under these circumstances
should be one in which an interpreter asks not "what the legislation means abstractly, or even on the basis of legislative
history, but also what it ought to mean in terms of the needs
and goals of our present-day ~ociety.""~
135. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supm note 67, at 20; William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U . PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). For the most provocative and much criticized challenge to originalism as a method of statutory
interpretation, see G. CALABRESI,
A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982).
136. But note that such theories also raise the problem of legislative supremacy. See, e.g., Maltz, supm note 118, at 12 (noting that the approaches of those
advocating a dynamic interpretation are inconsistent with the theory of legislative
supremacy).
137. Eskridge, supm 110, at 1480.
138. See id. at 1480 n.5 (quoting Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rllles or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950) (emphasis deleted)).
139. Id. at n.6 (quoting Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Stat-
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When such a determination is made in light of the "societal, political, and legal context," the agency's interpretation
appears to be inconsistent with the present-day political climate which has witnessed the ushering in of a new world (political) order. In Abourezk, however, the agency determination
seemed consistent with certain subsequent events on the one
hand;140 but contrary to the societal and political context of
subsequent amendments to the statute on the other hand.l4'
Specifically, the ever-expanding grounds of exclusion were
narrowed, somewhat, in 1977 in response to a n international
agreement designed to foster greater freedom between signatory states and to promote greater flow of information across
borders.
A. Helsinki Accords and McGbvern Amendment
Seeking to secure human rights throughout the world, the
United States signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975. While the
United States saw the Accords as a method to pressure the
then Soviet Union's policy with respect to emigration, the Accords also reflected on the United States' own immigration
policy. The signatories pledged themselves to facilitate and
foster greater international freedom of movement and exchange
of ideas.
The principle underlying both the first amendment and the
Helsinki Accords is the concept of an open "marketplace of
ideas."Under the first amendment, United States citizens are
guaranteed the right to receive and exchange ideas with
whomever they wish. The Basket I11 provisions of the Accords
extend this principle to the international arena by facilitating
the free exchange of ideas and persons across national borders. The Accords, as an international declaration, seek to
accomplish universal freedom of expression, a goal which is of
particular significance to the international community of
writers.142

utes, 3 VAND.L. REV. 456, 469 (1950)).
140. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text on the discussion about the
Shah of Iran and the Tehran Hostage incident and the newlycraRed "foreign policy" exclusion ground passed in the 1990 amendment to the INA; see also H.R.
COW. REP. NO. 955, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1990) (citing the Shah of Iran's
mere presence in the United States as the trigger for the Iran hostage crisis).
141. See infra notes 142-150 and accompanying text on the Helsinski Accords
and the McGovern Amendment.
142. Miranda, supm note 77, at 307.
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The ideological exclusion provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, former subsections 27, 28, and 29, inhibited
the free flow of ideas and persons across national boundaries.
One of the issues in Abourezk was whether subsection 27
should have been interpreted narrowly to avoid exclusions in
light of the Helsinki Accords. The denial of entry in the
Abourezk case directly conflicted with the tenor of the Helsinki
Accords. 143
The Helsinki Accords were not the only indication of a
liberalizing environment for international movement. In 1977,
former subsection 28-the most controversial of the three ideological a n d n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s exclusion provi~ions'~~-underwentlegislative modification of questionable
significance, when Congress enacted the McGovern Amendment.'" This amendment sought t o assure United States
compliance with the Helsinki Final Act with regard to free
movement across international borders, and t o encourage other
signatories to comply with the terms of the Final Act.'" Subsection 28 was the only one of the three formerly ideological
and national interests grounds for exclusion for which a waiver
of admissibility was available. Under the amendment, within
with a prothirty days of a visa denial because of
scribed organization, the Secretary of State "~hould"'~'recommend to the Attorney General that a waiver be granted if the
alien was "otherwise admissible t o the United States."148This
latter point is emphasized in a second sentence in the statutory
provision: "Nothing in this section may be construed as authorizing or requiring the admission to the United States of any
alien who is excludible for reasons other than membership in o r
filiation with a proscribed organi~ation."'~~
Neither sub-

143. Id. at 305.
144. The third ground of exclusion was INA 6 212(a)(29).
145. Pub. L. No. 95-105, 91 Stat. 848 (1977) (codified as amended a t
22 U.S.C. $ 2691 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-649, Title VI, $ 603(aX18>, 104 Stat. 5084 (1990).
146. Miranda, supm note 77, at 310. But see id. at 310 33.55 (reserving the
right to restrict travel on a reciprocal basis).
147. "Should" carries the connotation that the action ought to be executed as
distinguished from the mandatory "shall." In other words, "should" falls in between
"may" which connotes a discretionary determination and "shall."
148. 22 U.S.C. 8 2691(a) (1988); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1056-58
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
149. 22 U.S.C. $ 2691(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
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section 27 nor subsection 29 were affected by the McGovern
Amendment.
Since the Accords were an executive agreement rather
than a formal treaty, they did not displace these statutory
provisions. Specifically, the McGovern Amendment did not
apply to subsection 27, the subject of the interpretive issue in
Abourezk. The McGovern Amendment applied only to visa
applicants who were "otherwise admissible to the United
States."lso On any theory of original intent, the Helsinki Accords and the McGovern Amendment were not relevant as a
practical matter. lsl
Nevertheless, these subsequent developments in the law
changed the environment in which subsection 27, originally
enacted in the Cold War days of 1952, was applied. The subsequent concern for opening borders to views of persons with
other affiliations and ideologies made anachronistic an interpretation of subsection 27 that derived from cold war fears and
excluded persons for their associations rather than their specific activities. However, the government argued in Abourezk that
the reason for exclusion was based on the visa applicants' specific governmental associations, not on blanket organizational
communist ideology.152 If that is a correct reading of the
government's position, then its adoption would not have necessarily been counter to the concern that ideas be free-flowing
across international borders. But the unique characteristic of
these denials, limited to governmental associations and not
strictly based on ideology, made it difficult to find other instances in the record to support a consistent approach.

150. 785 F.2d at 1069 (Bork, J., dissenting). As discussed more fully below, the
visa applicants in Abourezk were specifically denied entry because of their governmental c o ~ e d i o n sand not their membership in a proscribed organization.
151. Moreover, as Professor Aleinikoff notes, the required deference to the
agency's statutory interpretation is a shortcoming of the dynamic interpretive approach. Aleinikoff, supm note 67, at 45-46.
152. In the consolidated actions, the first applicant was Tomas Borge, the
Interior Minister of Nicaragua. In his situation, the Nicaraguan government had
applied to the U.S. embassy in Managua for his nonimmigrant visa. As for the
circumstances surrounding the denial of a nonimmigrant visa to Nino Pasti, the
U.S. government had argued that he was a member of an instrumentality of the
Soviet government. In the case of Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodriguez Lezcano, their
visa applications had been conveyed by diplomatic note from the Cuban government. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1048-49.
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B. Congressional Acquiescence and Past
Administrative Practice
On appeal in Abourezk Judge Ginsburg found the agency's
interpretation wanting because the government had failed to
establish a pattern of administrative practice t o support a fmding that Congress had acquiesced in the administrative interpretation. Ginsburg concluded, therefore, that the district court
had erred in failing t o develop an adequate record prior to
reaching its determination. The remand was ordered t o permit
further discovery on this issue.ls5 As earlier noted, such an
exercise would prove futile.
Judge Ginsburg concluded that Congress was apprised at
least once that the DOS actually had applied its asserted interpretation of subsection 27. According to Ginsburg, evidence of
congressional acquiescence (or lack thereof) in an administrative construction of the statutory language during the thirtyfour years since the Act had been passed could be important,'" concluding that information about such acquiescence,
or absence of it, would rank as a significant indicator of the
legislature's will.lSS That view is highly questionable at
best? Nonetheless, the majority determined that the evidence of record was meager and did not demonstrate the kind
of consistent administrative interpretation necessary t o give
rise t o a presumption of congressional acquie~cence.'~~

153. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1064.
154. Id. at 1055.
155. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1965) (showing the Court's willingness to recognize congressional acquiescence to executive discretion, giving credence
to the Court's interpretation of subsection 27). The majority in Abourezk found that
the two cases cited by the parties interpreting subsection 27 provided no support
for the DOS's interpretation as evidence of congressional acquiescence in a longstanding judicial construction. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1055 11.12 (citing El-Werfalli
v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) and Allende v. Schultz, 605 F. Supp.
1220 @. Mass. 1985)). In El-Werfalli, the court held that a Libyan student seeking
to enter the United States in order to study airplane maintenance was properly
excluded under subsection 27. The majority in Abourezk concluded that although
"such study does not rise to the level of subversive activity, it clearly constitutes
an 'activity' exceeding mere presence." Id. In Allende, the majority found that the
wurt there did not reach this precise issue because it held the government's reasons for exclusion inadequate on other grounds. Id.
156. See generally REYNOLDS,
supra note 62, at 250-54.
157. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958) (refusing to impute to congress approval of the DOS's decisions where the decisions were "scattered
rulings . . . not consistently of one pattern").
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In remanding, Judge Ginsburg failed to follow faithfully
the guidelines of Chevron; rather, she apparently engaged in a
form of judicial subterfuge with the hope that on remand "justice" would be done. But to the extent that the issue could be
considered close, Chevron commands that the court defer t o a
reasonable administrative interpretation. In criticizing the
u d g concluded
e
remand-finding
it u ~ e c e s s a r y ~ ~ ~ ~Bork
that the majority's decision deprived the Executive "of much of
the flexibility and nuance that are essential in the conduct of
foreign relations,"'" and began "a process of judicial incursion into the United States' conduct of its foreign affairs."1B0
In remanding the case t o the district court for a fuller
"airing of the activitylmere entry" question, the majority concluded that the legislative history was inconclusive. Thus further evidence of legislative acquiescence was needed before it
could assess the validity of the agency's interpretation. In
reaching this conclusion the majority assumed that more evidence was indeed available. Visa denials, which may have a
substantial impact on aliens seeking admission to the United
States, receive only limited internal administrative oversight
and almost no judicial consideration.16' What the evidence
did show was that there were very few visa denials in this
area.162It was not likely, therefore, that anything of real consequence would be accomplished on remand. Thus, the remand
appeared to be futile on its face. Even the majority alluded t o
this when it stated that "the examples cited by the State Department, in conjunction with the inconclusive legislative history, however, do cast some doubt on the plaintiffs' interpretat i ~ n . " 'Moreover,
~
the Court of Appeals gave no guidance t o
the district court concerning what to do if no further evidence
was pertinent.
Judge Ginsburg proclaimed that the purpose of the remand
was to assure congressional acquiescence in the agency's interAbourezk, 785 F.2d at 1064.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1076.
See James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66
WASH.
L. REV. 1 (1991); see also Note, National Security Visa Denials: Delimiting
the Exercise of Executive Exclusion Authority Under the Imnigratwn and Natwnality Act, 28 VA.J. IN'T'L L. 711 (1988).
162. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1067 n.2. Further, "government records relating to
visa requests are required by law to be kept confidential." Id. at 1067-68 (citing 8
U.S.C. 1202(f) (1982)).
163. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1056; see also id. at 1067-68 (Bork, J., dissenting).
158.
159.
160.
161.
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pretation. But both she and the Chevron Court have failed to
realize that even if the practice is proved, it is no guarantee of
congressional intent. The intent of the legislature is that which
was intended by the Congress that enacted the legislation in
question, not the subsequent bodies that may have acquiesced
in a certain interpretation put forth by the agency.
One reason to look at consistent interpretations of agencies
or courts is the likelihood that they build up expectations. This
is one of the concerns underlying stare decisis, and may be
strong enough to override an otherwise better interpretation.
But in this case there was no reliance on past decisions. Even
if the agency had engaged in previous exclusions, the alien
denied a visa and the citizens who invited her have in no way
relied upon the agency's position. The only form of reliance that
might have been posited was that the agency relied on the
statute in not seeking a new basis fkom the legislature to authorize its behavior. If the agency interpretation had been
reversed, it would have merely required the agency to make a
request for legislative action at a time later than it should have
made. A better rationale for discovery of past practice would
have been that the court must assure itself that the agency%
interpretation is of some weight because it has been interpreted that way consistently over a series of administrations. However, that relates to the due deference criteria and not a determination of congressional intent.
Although consideration of the agency's interpretation is
part of the Chevron formula, the issue of due deference may be
at the crux of the problem in adjudication of statutory construction issues. As Judge Posner recently wrote, "the canon that
the interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency
that enforces it is entitled t o great weight by the courts"'"
rests on "an unrealistic view of the political process."'65 According to Judge Posner, "[tlhere is no reason to expect adrninistrative agency members, appointed and confirmed long after
the enactment of the legislation they are enforcing, to display a
special fidelity to the original intent of the legislation rather
than to the current policies of the Administration and the Congre~s."'~
Judge
~
Posner recommends that a current agency
interpretation not be given any particular weight unless the
164. Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 124, at 810.
165. Id. at 810-11.
166. Id.
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interpretation has persisted through several changes of Administration.lB7Thus, one can conclude that Judge Posner views
an agency's interpretation as suspect unless it has withstood
the test of time, which appears to be the case here.
I surmise that Judge Ginsburg viewed the agency's interpretation in Abourezk as suspect as well-as indeed it was.
This is particularly true here because in at least one of the
cases, the consular officer abroad had originally denied the visa
under subsection 28,'" a waivable basis for exclusion under
the McGovern Amendment. When the advisory opinion was
issued by the DOS, the consular official was informed that
subsection 27 should be the basis for denial because foreign
policy considerations were implicated. Under subsection 27, no
such waivable basis for exclusion is available. And so the plot
thickens.
Mter former President Reagan took office in 1981, the
Administration began using subsections 27, 28, and 29 of section 212(a) of the INA on a much wider scale.lBgAdministration officials routinely cited "foreign policy reasons," and occasionally stated that they did not want to provide "a propaganda
platform" in the United States for the excluded indi~iduals.'~~
Then Secretary of State, George Schultz, remarked on the
Borge visa denial: "As a general proposition I think we have t o
favor freedom of speech, but it can get abused by people who do
not wish us well, and I think we have to take some reasonable
precautions about that."l7l This statement definitely indicates
an intent to impede the free flow of ideas across international
borders.
Although certain policies of a particular Administration
may be suspect, the Reagan administration was not the only

167. Id. at 811. But in Abourezk, the government had submitted evidence demonstrating that its interpretation had been applied consistently, albeit infrequently,
by subsequent administrations. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 885 11.14
(D.D.C. 1984) (citing examples of several different administrations excluding aliens
for foreign policy reasons).
168. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (in the case
of Nino Pasti).
supm note 75, at 204; see also Nathan M. Eider,
169. A L E ~ o F F& -TIN,
Note, First Amendment and the Alien Exclusion Power-What Standard of Review?,
4 CARDOZOL. REV.457 (1983); D i o ~ e Issue
,
and Debate: Barring Aliens for Political Reasons, N.Y. TIMES,Dec. 8, 1983.
170. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 75, at 204.
171. Atkinson, Congressmen, Others Denounce Denial of Visas to US. Critics,
THE WASH.
PO=, Dec. 3, 1983, at A12.
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administration that has denied entry to foreign nationals for
dubious political r e a ~ 0 n s . lAlso,
~ ~ notwithstanding particular
administration policies, agencies may, nonetheless, know more
than the courts about the legislation they implement.'" This
is an appropriate rationale for giving an agency's interpretation
reasonable deference, as now mandated by Chevron. "[Tlo the
extent [agencies] support their interpretation with reasons at
least plausibly based on superior knowledge the courts should
give that interpretation weight."174 Although the particular
evidence available in this case is sparse on prior practice, what
was offered by the government's affidavits would seem t o support a consistent interpretati~n.'~~
Admittedly, the statutory issues in Abourezk are complex.
Essentially, the term "activities" is clear enough as t o its literal
meaning;'76 and the legislative history, as stated earlier, is
inconclusive at best or indeed may even suggest an "activities"
based exclusion mind-set. Only because the agency has interpreted the term t o include "entry or mere presence" does the
pertinent issue of statutory construction even arise in this case.
The language in subsection 27 is broad and sweeping in scope.
Further this was not the first time that the agency had given
such a construction to the term.'77 Moreover, there are no
guarantees that a judge is a more competent "surveyor[] of
[the] legal topography" than the agency to which Congress has
charged the implementation of its statutes.'"
The example which the Government gave most readily to
justify this interpretation at the time involved the Shah of Iran
and the resulting take-over of the American embassy and the
hostage crisis in 1979.'" Of course this event took place
172. Alexander Wohl, Free Speech and the Right of Entry into the United
States: Legislation to Remedy the Ideological Exclusion Provisions of the Immigmtion and Naturalization Act, 4 AM. U . J. IN13L L. & POL'Y,443, 459 & n.72 (1989)
(detailing "a wide range of individuals in a variety of fields* affected by visa deni-

als).
173. Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supm note 124, at 811.
174. Id.
175. Government Brief at 6-7, Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (No. 86656).
176. The term "activities* is defined primarily as "1. the state or quality of
being active; the state of acting; action; doing." THE RANDOM
HOUSEDICTIONARY
15 (unabridged ed. 1981).
OF THE ENGLISHLANGUAGE
177. Government Brief at 12 n.8, Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (No.
86-656).
178. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 381.
179. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 884-85 (D.D.C. 1984).
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many years after enactment of the legislation in question and
subsection 27 did not serve as a basis for exclusion of the Shah
because he was eventually admitted. For the adherents of the
school of dynamic statutory interpretation, this information has
its appeal. As noted below, this very example figured prominently in the most recent amendments to the INA designed to
re-craft a "foreign policy" exclusion ground.lgONonetheless,
the critical issue here is whether the agency's interpretation of
the statutory provision can take precedence over the plain or
literal meaning of the statutory language and the apparent
leaning of the legislative history towards the plaintiffs' position. The answer to the foregoing question should have been,
perhaps surprisingly, in the affirmative.
In refusing t o resolve the "activity/mere entry" question on
the record before it (favorable to the government) and remanding the case t o the district court for further proceedings (consistent with its decision), the divided Court of Appeals failed to
comply with the Chevron mandate, to wit, t o defer to a reasonable agency construction of the statutory provision in question.
This should have been the court's focus on appeal but it was
not. Under the circumstances and in most situations, the
search for congressional intent can be exhaustive, frustrating,
illusive and entirely capable of result-oriented judicial outcomes. So, if other agendas were at work here, because the
majority is not entirely candid about its decision, what did the
remand accomplish for the parties and the courts? The overwhelming evidence connected t o the remand of this case suggests that little was in fact accomplished other than the needless consumption of limited judicial resources in an effort to
avoid the inevitable exclusions.
As noted above, a divided Court of Appeals vacated the
district court's judgment in Abourezk and remanded it for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.lgl The case proceeded before the district court under the terms of the Court of
Appeals' remand.lg2The district court stated that the consolidated cases were remanded to it to decide two issues. The first
issue related to the "activity/mere entry" dichotomy and the

180. See infia notes 217-29 and accompanying text concerning the legislative
history accompanying the 1990 amendments of INA 5 212(a).
181. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
182. Abourezk v. Reagan, Nos. 83-3739, 83-3895, 1988 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5203,
at *4 (D.D.C. June 7, 1988) (LEXIS,Genfed library, Dist. file).
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second related to the relationship between subsection 27 and
subsection 28, particularly the relationship of the McGovern
Amendment to the latter provision. All parties had agreed a t
the outset that the "public interest[,] . . . welfare, safety, o r
security" language is sufficiently broad to include foreign policy
concerns.lss So another obstacle t o agency deference was constructed.
Subsequent t o the remand, the district court afforded the
government an opportunity t o present additional evidence of
congressional acquiescence as mandated by the Court of Ap-peals. The district court concluded that the government had
failed in its task. Although the government had presented some
new evidence of an administrative practice, acquiesced in by
Congress, to support its interpretation of subsection 27, the
district court found that the additional evidence was "only
imperceptibly more weighty than it was when the cases were
before the Court in 1984."lg4Furthermore, the district court
read the appellate court's majority opinion as a mandate to
enter judgment for plaintiffs unless the government could satisfy this inquiry. As such, the district court found against the
government on the first issue.
As t o the second issue concerning the relationship between
subsection 27 and subsection 28 of the INA and the McGovern
Amendment which modified the latter but not the former, the
focus of the district court's inquiry was on whether the visa
denials in these consolidated cases were based on a threat to
the public interest, etc., "independent of the fact of membership
in or afE1iation with the . . . [proscribed] organization" set forth
in subsection 28. Because the appellate court had concluded
that the government could not satisfy this inquiry by the mere
assertion that the reason for exclusion was in addition to and
not independent of the fact of membership in such an organization, the district court likewise found against the government
on the second issue.185
Although the McGovern Amendment did not alter the
provisions of subsection 27 in any manner, this additional requirement created by the judiciary virtually guaranteed an adverse decision for the government on remand. Notwithstanding
the fact that exclusion grounds are separate and independent
183. Id. at *4 n.7.
184. Id. at *14-*15.
185. Id. at *16.
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grounds of exclusion and that an alien may be subject t o exclusion on more than one ground, the judiciary's determination on
this issue required their connection. On the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court then granted
the plaintiffs' motion and denied the government's motion. The
court specifically noted that the plaintiffs (nearly five years
after the original fling) were still anxious to have the four
aliens-who were equally anxious (apparently)--come t o the
United States t o fulfill their speaking engagements?' Therefore, the court ordered that appropriate entry visas be issued t o
the four aliens. The court, however, lacked the requisite statutory authority to order such action. Not surprisingly, the case
went up on appeal once again.'''
On the second round of review (now a year later), a different appellate panel found that only one of the consolidated
cases that comprised the original Abourezk u. Reagan case (now
called City of New York u. Baker) presented a live controversy.
In that remaining case, the appellate court held that the district court, in ordering the issuance of the visa, had exceeded
its authority. As a result, the case was remanded to the district
court once again for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the appellate court's opinion.
Although the second time around the appellate court did
not, in effect, overrule the earlier panel's decision in this case,
subsequent and intervening events rendered much of the earlier case moot. The significance of the much-heralded majority's
decision in the original Abourezk case was severely undermined. These subsequent events also underscored the clear
political nature of the agency decisions rendered in these cases.
As discussed more fully below, Congress intervened as well.
The events following the district court's decision on remand
included, among other political acts, the passage of the
"Moylllhan-Frank Amendment,"'88 which Congress enacted
subsequent t o the challenged visa denials. The Amendment
established a general prohibition against the exclusion of aliens
because of beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged
in by a United States citizen in the United States, would be

186. Id. at *22 n.29.
187. City of New York v. Baker, 878 F.2d 507, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
188. Pub. L. No. 100-204, 901(a), 100 Stat. 1400-01 (as extended by Pub. L.
No. 100-461, 555(a), 102 Stat. 2268-36 to -37 (1988)), popularly referred to as the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1987, as modified in 1988.
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protected under the U.S. Constit~tion.'~~
While the government took a n appeal on the merits in Abourezk u. Reagan,lgo
the first of the three consolidated cases, it appealed only the
scope of the district court's order in the remaining two
cases'g' because it had concluded that the Amendment prohibited exclusion of these aliens on the bases initidly asserted
under subsection 28. Another subsequent event formally disposed of the Abourezk case.

C. Presidential Proclamations
On October 22, 1988, President Reagan issued a presidential proclamation which specifically prohibited "officers and
employees of the Government of Nicaragua" from entering the
United States as temporary visitors.'gz Accordingly, the parties agreed that this proclamation constituted "an independent
intervening cause for future exclusions of Tomas Borge, the
Interior Minister of Nicaragua," who was the subject of the visa
denial in the original Abourezk u. Reagan.'" Thereafter, the
appellate court dismissed the appeal in Abourezk u. Reagan
and instructed the district court to vacate its judgment and
dismiss that case on mootness grounds.lg4
Three years earlier, President Reagan had issued a presidential proclamation which, presumably, should have disposed
of the second case involving the Cuban foreign nationals.1g5
Section 1 of the Proclamation states:
Entry of the following classes of Cuban nationals a s
nonimmigrants is hereby suspended: (a) officers or employees
of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba
holding diplomatic or official passports; and (b) individuals
who, notwithstanding the type of passport that they hold, are

189. Id.
190. Civil Action No. 83-3739.
191. City of New York v. Baker, Civil Action No. 83-3741 and Cronin v. Baker, Civil Action No. 83-3895.
192. Proclamation No. 5887, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,185 (1988).
193. City of New York v. Baker, 878 F.2d 507, 509 0 . C . Cir. 1989) (citing
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) for the proposition that
a "case becomes moot if neither party has [a] legally cognizable interest in [the]
final determination of factual and legal questions").
194. Id (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)).
195. Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,329 (1985), entitled "Suspension of
Entry as Non-Immigrants by Officers or Employees of the Government of Cuba or
the Communist Party of Cuba," was signed by President Reagan on October 4,
1985.

180

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

considered by the Secretary of State or his designee to be
officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba.lg6

In the Court of Appeals' earlier opinion in this case, the
majority noted that "[ilf this Proclamation covers Finlay and
Lezcano, the President's directive might constitute an independent intervening cause for future exclusions, and thus render
the City of New York case moot" in constitutional terms.lg7
But like the issue of administrative practice and congressional
acquiescence, the appellate court the first time around found
the record on the mootness issue inadequate as well. Similarly,
the impact of this issue was left to be resolved on remand to
the district court.'" On remand, however, the district court
did not consider the mootness issue.199
Over appellees' technical objections, the Court of Appeals,
in agreement with the government this time around, determined that the controversy over Lezcano's visa denial under
subsection 27 was no longer viable and therefore dismissed the
case as moot.200The court, on the other hand, rejected the
government's contention that the "Moynihan-Frank Amendment" had, a t least, rendered the Cronin case "prudentially
moot." The basis for this rejection was the conclusion that this
Amendment did not address the "activitylentry" distinction
originally raised in Abourezk v. Reagan.201And because the
government had not renounced its earlier position on this issue,
it remained possible for the Secretary of State to deny a future
visa application fled by Nino Pasti, the former member of the
Italian Senate who had been denied originally on the basis of
his membership in the World Peace Council which, according to
the DOS, was an instrumentality of the former Soviet government. Thus, the court declined to dismiss the case but did hold
eventually that the district court had exceeded its authority
when it ordered the issuance of a visa to Pasti. On appeal, the
court vacated that portion of the district court's order and re-

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
interim,
201.

Id.
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.2 @.C. Cir. 1986).
Id.
City of New York v. Baker, 878 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id. The court had already acknowledged that since Finlay had died in the
only Lezcano's right to a visa remained at issue in this case. Id. at 509.
Id. at 511.
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manded (again) for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the court's opinion.202
Given the new world (political) order, it is doubtful that
there are presently, or will be in the foreseeable future, much
call for speakers at nuclear rally protests. Further, with the fall
of communism in Eastern Europe and the dismantling of the
Soviet Union, concern regarding membership in former Soviet
instrumentalities has no doubt declined appreciably. Thus, i n
the future Nino Pasti should have no difficulty visiting this
country. Again, this observation underscores the largely political nature of the government's actions in this case, leaving for
the two political branches of government, Congress and the
Executive Branch, to strike a n appropriate balance ("deal")
policy-wise.

D. The Relevance of Subsequent Amendments to
the Critique on the Judicial Process
Subsequent to the original appellate decision in Abourezk,
Congress took a number of steps to liberalize visa denial policies based on political beliefs. First, Congress passed temporary
provisions to ease the restrictions on free speech activities.203
These first steps at reform, however, only partially ameliorated
the harsh exclusion provisions of an "anachronistic immigration
s t a t ~ t e . "They
~ ~ were piecemeal legislative tinkering that
never f d y addressed the issues raised by litigation. Finally, it
took a thorough overhaul of the INA to bring about the much
needed changes i n these provisions nearly nine years after the
final report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy which had recommended substantial immigration
reform proposals. Interestingly, the Select Commission, which
otherwise advanced reform proposals for a comprehensive overhaul of the INA, "ducked the thorny political controversies that
might be involved in recasting the grounds of exclusion."205
This observation further underscores the political nature of the
debate and why courts should not try to tackle these "thorny

202. Id. at 512.
203. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-201, $ 901(a), 101
Stat. 1331, 1399 (1987), modified by Pub. L. No. 100-461, $ 555, 102 Stat. 2268
(1988), Pub. L. No. 101-246, 8 128, 104 Stat. 15, 30 (1990).
.
204. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN,
JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMUIMIGRATION
FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDETO LAW AND PRACTICE 74 (3d ed. 1994).
205. ALEINKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 75, at 183.
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political controversies." Of course, that does not mean they
should remain silent. For example, in Lennon u. INS?06 the
court commented that the exclusion provisions listed in the
INA constitute "a magic mirror, reflecting the fears and concerns of past Congres~es."~~'
More recently, Judge Sterling
Johnson in the Second Circuit lamented that his hands, in
effect, were tied due to congressional inaction and excoriated
the Executive Branch for the harshness of its (unconscionable)
policy on Haitian refugees.z0s
After addressing illegal immigration in 1986, Congress
used the occasion of a comprehensive revision to the INA,
namely the Immigration Act of 1990,209to totally revamp the
security-related exclusion grounds. If statutory interpretation
has as its goal an attempt to reflect the current societal and
political context, the changes made during that legislative session reveal an agency acting out of step with the times. But
fmt, in 1987, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, which suspended until
March 1, 1989, sections of the INA that had prohibited admission into the United States because of beliefs or associations, or
the anticipated content of statements made by a noncitizen
while in the United States.210Unlike the McGovern Amendment which extended only t o foreign nationals entering on
temporary visits, this Authorization Act extended to those seeking to immigrate on a permanent basis.
In the Act of October 1, 1988?11 which extended section
901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for two years,
Congress restricted its application to nonimmigrants only. The
206. 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975).
207. Id. at 189.
208. Haitian Centers Council Inc. v. McNary, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8452, *4*5 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 1992).
209. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
210. Section 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Ad, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400 (1987), provided in relevant part:
(a) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
alien may be denied a visa or excluded from admission into the United
States, subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the United
States, or subject to deportation because of any past, current, or expected
beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged in by a United
States citizen in the United States, would be protected under the Constitution of the United States.
211. Foreign Operations Appropriations Ad, Pub. L. No. 100-461, 5 555, 102
Stat. 2268, 2268-36 and 2268-37 (1988).
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temporary change did not apply t o denials of visas or admission
based on foreign policy considerations or national security as
long as those exclusions were not based on beliefs or activities
. ~ ~ aspect of the legislative
protected by the C o n s t i t u t i ~ nThis
initiative is similar to the Abourezk majority's insistence that
there be no overlap between exclusion grounds. But unlike the
legislative measure, the judicial requirement lacked legislative
authority. Still it fits a dynamic approach to statutory interpretation.
In early 1990, Congress made this restricted section 901
permanent.213The new legislation, in effect, permanently prohibited the government from barring foreign nationals from
entering the country on a temporary basis because of their
political beliefs. In signing the bill, then President Bush stated
that he was not bound by several provisions in the measure
that limited his authority t o conduct foreign relation^.^" In
fact, a news item at the time reported that a senior official had
told the Washington Post that "the administration [was] considering suing Congress t o test the constitutionality of some

provision^."'^
Later that year, Congress passed the Immigration Act of
1990 which both broadened and narrowed the political and
national security exclusion grounds.216 House conferees, in
deciding on the appropriate amendments to these particular
grounds, established a single provision authorizing the executive branch t o exclude foreign nationals for foreign policy reasons in certain limited circumstances. Elements of the former
subsections 27 and 29 were incorporated into new subsections
3(A) and 3(B) of section 212(a). In so doing, the conferees stated
as follows:
Under current law there is some ambiguity as to the authority of the Executive Branch to exclude aliens on foreign policy
grounds (this ambiguity is a result of the overlapping nature
of the basic grounds for exclusion as set out in Section 212(a)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Section 901 of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988

212. Miranda, supra note 77, at 302.
213. Pub. L. No. 101-246, $ 128(b), 104 Stat. 15, 30 (1990); see 67 Int. Rel.
201 (1990).
214. 67 Int. Rel. 202 (1990).
215. Id
216. STEPHENH.LEGOMSKY,
L MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 341 (1992).
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and 1989, as amended, and the "McGovern Amendment"). The
foreign policy provision in this title would establish a single
clear standard for foreign policy exclusions (which is designated a s 212(a)(3)(C) of the INA). The conferees believe that
granting an alien admission to the United States is not a sign
of approval or agreement and the conferees therefore expect
that, with the enactment of this provision, aliens will be excluded not merely because of the potential signal that might
be sent because of their admission, but when there would be a
clear negative foreign policy impact associated with their

Thus, the legislative history of this newly crafted provision
indicates that the executive branch is authorized to exclude
aliens for foreign policy reasons in certain circumstances. These
"certain circumstances" are described as those based on the
reasonable belief held by the Secretary of State that an alien's
entry or proposed activities within the United States would have
potentially adverse foreign policy consequences.218This aspect
of the new measure's legislative history emphasizes the lack of
distinction between the dichotomy that was previously litigated. There are, however, two pertinently detailed exceptions
covering officials (or electoral candidates for government office)
of foreign governments and all other aliens when their exclusion implicates past, current or expected beliefs, statements or
in the United state^.^"
associations which would be la*
217. H.R. COW. REP.NO. 955, 10lst. Cong., 2d Sess. 128-29 (1990) (emphasis
added).
218. Id. at 129.
219. Id. As to the first exception involving foreign government officials or those
candidates seeking election to a foreign government office, the legislative history
specifically contemplates that such foreign nationals would not be excludable under
the foreign policy provision "solely because of any past, current or expected beliefs,
statements or associations which would be lawful in the United States." Id. To
further underscore the importance of this exception, the Conference Report states:
The word "solely" is used in this provision to indicate that, in cases involving government officials, the committee intends that exclusions not be
based merely on, for example, the possible content of an alien's speech in
this country, but that there be some clear foreign policy impad beyond
the mere fad of the speech or its content, that would permit exclusion.
Id.
As to the second exception concerning all other aliens, the government is required to demonstrate a compelling United States foreign policy interest, attested
to by the personal opinion of the Secretary of State and certified t o the relevant
Congressional oversight committees, if first amendment activities are implicated.
Recall that this was essentially the district court's view in the first round of
litigation involving Abourezk v. Reagan. But that court had concluded, aRer an in
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Admittedly, the subsequent amendments are relevant to
this critique because they support the fact that congressional
update of the anachronistic exclusion provisions-the subject of
much litigation-was hotly debated and well overdue. However,
the legislative history, as found in the Conference Report discussed above, underscores the strictly political nature of this
inquiry. More important, the political contours of the inquiry
and the need for compromise between the political branches
highlights the rationale for allowing such updating, putting
aside the issue of legitimacy of evolutive theories of interpretation and legislative supremacy, to occur in the political forum
with the advice, counsel and input of the administration agencies and the executive branch along with interested individuals
(i.e., lobbyists).
For example, the legislative history refers to the American
hostage incident involving the Shah of Iran for not making the
"activitylentry" distinction as part of the policy rationale. Although it used this as a n example of a compelling U.S. foreign
policy interest, it adds to the weight of evidence indicating the
reasonableness of the agency's position on the interpretive
issue in this case.
As noted above, elements of the former subsections 27 and
29 appear in newly-cratted subsections under section 212(a).
There is, however, "a rough relationship" between former subsection 28 and the new subsection 3(D) of section 212(a), which
covers immigrant members of totalitarian parties.220 For
nonimmigrants, the new amendments contain no exclusion
ground analogous to former section 212(a)(28).221 For immicamera inspection which the majority in the appellate case had criticized, that the
confidential information had satisfactorily indicated that this was more than just
the possible content of the speeches. As stated then, "an alien invited to impart information and ideas to American citizens in circumstances such as these may not
be excluded under subsection (27) solely on account of the content of his proposed
message." Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 887 (D.D.C.1984).
su220. For a fuller discussion describing these new provisions, see LEGOMSKY,
pra note 216, at 342.
221. As Professor Legomsky notes:
Given the limits that sedion 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Ad had already placed on old subsection 28, however, the omission of an
analogous nonimmigrant exclusion ground is probably not a significant
change. Virtually all the activities mentioned in subsection 28-advocacy,
be protected under the
publication, party membership, etc.-would
Brandenburg test unless they were calculated to incite, and likely to incite, imminent lawless action. In that latter event, the alien would generally be excludable under new subsection 3(AXii) in any event.
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grants, however, the exclusion grounds have been
narrowed.222Visa applicants seeking permanent admission
may still be denied on the basis of their political membership~.~=
Finally, the new legislation repealed both section 901 of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989, as amended, and the McGovern Amendment and removed membership in or affiliation with the communist party
. ~ ~ this later
as a ground for exclusion of n ~ n i m m i g r a n t sWith
act, prior practice under the McGovern Amendment requiring
nonimmigrants who were otherwise excludable under former
subsection 28 to go through an "automatic" waiver process was
necessarily d i s ~ o n t i n u e d . ~ ~
Section 2l2(a)(3)(C), the newly-crafted provision, carving
out a single provision for foreign policy exclusions, was designed to alleviate legitimate concerns that former subsection
27 was being used t o exclude aliens on the basis of their beliefs, statements, or associations. This new foreign policy provision also sets forth, ostensibly, a clear standard for such exclusions and the circumstances under which they would be appropriate. This is the likely end result of a "negotiated" compromise between the legislative and executive branches of government.
It is doubtful that if the courts had taken a dynamic approach t o statutory interpretation, a similar outcome as the one
reached through legislative compromise could have been
achieved. This issue was admittedly "an especially sensitive
issue for Congress's con~ideration."~~
So, with the benefit of
hindsight, one could conclude that courts engaging in the process of interpreting statutes should not be adjudged by the
temper of the times. Instead, consistent with the doctrine of
legislative supremacy, courts should await appropriate modernization of statutes in the political arena even though the wait

LEGOMSKY,
supra note 216, at 342 (cross reference omitted).
222. Id.
223. New INA subsection 3(DXi) includes some of the aliens previously covered
by former subsection 28. Specifically, new subsection 3 0 x 3 covers associations but
not advocacy, publication, etc. It covers only associations with "the Communist or
any other totalitarian party" and not associations with other groups once regarded
as subversive under the old law. See INA $ 212(a)(28XI)(ii) (1982).
224. H.R.COW. REP.NO. 955, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1990).
225. Id.
226. ALEINIKOPF
& MARTIN,supra note 28, at 327.

139]

NATURE OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

187

may be a long one. But, more importantly, it is very doubtful
that this relatively recent statutory change could have been
accomplished prior to the concomitant change in the political
world order. As noted by commentators in the field, "[tlhe 1990
Act completes the work with regard t o ideological exclusion,
providing generous waivers of excludability for former Communist party members and permitting only limited exclusion
based on foreign policy considerations for other aliens whose
political ideas or affiliations are a matter of concern."227This
compromise no doubt reflects not only the new world order but
a growing belief or acceptance that there may no longer be a
clear divide between what is foreign and what is domestic poli~y.~=
Meanwhile, deference to the agency interpretation, if reasonable under the circumstances, should be the paramount
guiding principle in cases such as this one. Such was not the
case here, however. Instead, the Court of Appeals embarked
upon an odyssey of interpretive subterfuge in an effort t o avoid
the need to address the real considerations that should have
guided its decision. Admittedly, the Supreme Court application
of the Chevron doctrine over the years has been somewhat
inconsistent and has failed to provide the lower courts with
clear guidance as to when a court should defer to an agency's
construction of the statute.2zgBut in this particular area of
the law, little guidance is needed when it comes to the concept
of agency deference.
As discussed more fully below, the circumstances of the
Abourezk case presented such considerations. Specifically the
policy considerations attendant to immigration cases make
deference practical. Moreover, as the district court in Abourezk
had already observed, "in foreign affairs matters and those
involving the admission of aliens, the political branches have
the widest possible latitude in these respects."230

227. FRAGOMEN
& BELL,supra note 204.
228. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1980 (1993) (book review).
229. Johnson, supra nate 32, at 422.
230. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 886 n.19 (D.D.C.1984) (citing
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981)). Indeed, not one immigration statute, it would appear, had ever been invalidated on such grounds. Id.
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Applying traditional methods of statutory interpretation in
viewing the language and legislative history of the statute, the
agency's interpretation is admittedly not a very plausible one.
But at this juncture of the process, reliance on traditional tools
is not paramount because (a) they do not provide a satisfactory
answer to the question posed and (b) there are several complicating factors involved in this case that should have prompted
the court t o give more weight to the agency's position even
though it thought another view more enlightened. Additionally,
given the serious foreign policy ramifications following the
Shah of Iran's admission t o the United States in the late 1970s,
such an interpretation has a common sense appeal to it. Moreover, a focus on the reasonableness of the agency's viewpoint is
all that Chevron requires. And, presumably, such a focus would
have conserved limited judicial resources.231 Such an approach or, more appropriately, focus on the court's part in the
original appellate decision would have brought about finality to
the saga of this case much earlier. And as the Court has indicated previously in Fiallo v. Bell, the matter should more appropriately be taken up with Congress. More importantly, such
consideration would have been in keeping with the mandate of
Chevron.
In Abourezk Judge Ginsburg had elected, most likely, to
follow the approach several appellate courts have adopted by
giving Chevron a "weak" reading.232To approve an adminis231. This is apparently what the Committee on Immigration and Nationality
Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York had in mind when it
issued its 1985 report on visa denials based on ideological grounds:
In 1984 Congress had again an opportunity to effect major revisions
in this country's immigration laws.* * * But it would have left unscathed
and largely unexamined the disturbing legacy of the McCarthy era that
permits the denial of visas to the United States on ideological grounds.
The controversy stirred by such denials may explain but does not excuse
a failure to address the issue. In the hopes of encouraging the Legislature
to confront the controversy when it next examines these laws, we recommend the repeal of sections 212(a)(27)-(29) of the Immigration and Nationality A d , and their replacement with language that reflects this country's
values.
Visa Denials, supm note 128, at 249-50 (footnotes omitted).
232. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV.301, 302
(1988). In adopting such a reading of Chevron, the court resolves the ambiguities
in the statute itself rather than applying the deference principle. Id.; see also, John
F. Belcaster, The D.C. Circuits Use of the Chevron Test: Constructing a Positive
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trative construction a court "need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted . . . or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial pro~eeding."~~
All
that a court need do is determine whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable under the circumstances once the court
has concluded, after the application of the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, that the language is either silent on
the particular interpretive issue o r ambiguous.
More important, as Professor Diver has argued, "courts
should presumptively defer to agency interpretations of statutes in situations where Congress has endowed the agency
with significant policy-making resp~nsibility."~~
For those
commentators who argue against "a blanket rule of deference
to agency constructions whenever an agency charged with implementing a statute interprets it?" there are appropriate
factors for employing the Chevron mandate here. As Professor
Diver has remarked: "Since interpretation is inherently a form
of policymaking, courts should presumptively defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute under which the agency
exercises significant policymaking resp~nsibility."~~~
Such is
the case here. The DOS is such an agency with si@icant
authority in the issuance of visas under the immigration statutory scheme.
A. The Foreign Affairs Power
The principle of deference to the agency's interpretation
applies with special force when a statute involves a delegation
to the Executive of authority to make and implement decisions

Theory of Judicial Obedience and Disobedience, 44 ADMIN.L. REV.745 (1992) (providing a basis for formulating a positive theory of the D.C. Circuit's behavior
through an empirical examination of the court's use of the Chevron test).
233. Chevron USA. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.11 (1984); see also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ( " M e need not find
that [the agency's] construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the
result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.") (quoting Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153
(1946)); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US. 134, 140 (1944) ("[Tlhe rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [agency], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.").
234. Diver, supra note 1, at 552.
235. Callahan, supra note 57, at 1292.
236. Diver, supra note 1, at 593.
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relating to the conduct of foreign affairs. Not surprisingly,
Judge Bork paid particular attention to this aspect of the
Abourezk case in his dissent.237The Supreme Court has described the exclusion of aliens as "a fundamental act of sovereignty," stating that "the right [to exclude] stems not alone
from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power t o
control the foreign affairs of the nation."2s8 Therefore, in its
delegations of power in the area of foreign relations, Congress
"must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas,"23s and "[p]ractically every
volume of the United States Statutes contains one o r more
acts . . . of Congress authorizing action by the President in
respect of subjects affecting foreign relations, which either
leave the exercise of the power t o his unrestricted judgment, or
provide a standard far more general than that which has always been considered requisite with regard to domestic aff a i r ~ . The
" ~ ~INA
~ is one such statute.
As for the discussion about subsection 27 and whether it
authorizes the exclusion of aliens whose entry or presence in
the United States raises foreign policy concerns notwithstanding the plain language of the statute that seemingly
restricts activities only, the district court noted that the distinction between an alien's activities and his presence in the UnitAny person admitted
ed States is one without a differen~e.~~'
must engage in some activity in the United States, and entry
alone can have dramatic effects on American foreign policy.*

237. Judge Bork states in his dissent:
Plaintiffs have chosen an especially inhospitable legal environment in
which to attempt the resuscitation of the non-delegation doctrine, for it is
in the context of foreign affairs that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
upheld the legitimacy of broad and discretionary Executive power.
"[Blecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fad that the Executive is immediately privy to
information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted
upon by the legislature," statutes conferring authority upon the President
to conduct foreign affairs have necessarily been less detailed and specitic
than statutes concerned with domestic affairs.
Abourezk v. Regan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J. dissenting)
(citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)).
238. United States ex re!. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
239. Zernel, 381 U.S. at 17.
240. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936).
241. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 884 (D.D.C. 1984) (The court so
concluded after putting the inquiry in context.).
242. See, e.g., id. at 884-85 (discussing the impact of the admission of the
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The district court observed that it would be a non sequitur to
conclude that Congress meant to bar only those aliens who
would engage in prejudicial activities, but admit those whose
very entry would be prejudicial t o the public interest.
Further, Subsection 29 argues against drawing such a
distinction between entry and activities. Specifically, Congress
limited this particular exclusionary provision t o conduct occurring "after entry." Thus, such a distinction would render subsections 27 and 29 largely duplicative. Such a result would
offend the well-settled rule of construction that all parts of a
statute, if at all possible, are to be given effect.243Moreover,
immigration grounds for exclusion are not necessarily mutually
exclusive.
Finally, the extreme deference accorded the executive
branch in this particular area of the law is another factor
pointing to the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation of
the statute. This is particularly appropriate because, as Professor Sunstein once remarked, "[sltatutory construction is not a
search for direct decision of precise questions. . . . Congress
often doesn't foresee how its laws will be applied or what the
particular circumstances will be."2u Here, such a distinction
is unnecessary because the question of whether to limit exclusion to activities or mere presence is a pure question of policy,
given the nature of the sovereign's power in the area of admissions as discussed more fully below.245

B. The Plenary Power Doctrine
The context provided by the general field in which the
legislation operates is another powerful interpretive tool. Here,

Shah of Iran in 1979 which precipitated the taking of American hostages in Iran);
see also Greenwald, supra note 30, a t 234-35.
243. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 US. 609, 633
(1973).
244. K e ~ e t hW. Starr et al., Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a
Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 368-69 (1987) (remarks of Professor
Sunstein criticizing a broad reading of Chevron). Professor Sunstein specifically
describes Chevron as a "thumb on the scales in favor of the agency." Id. a t 371;
see also, Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM.L.
REV.2071, 2075 (1990) (noting that "[iln an extraordinarily wide range of
areas . . . Chevron has altered the distribution of national powers among courts,
Congress, and administrative agencies"). According to Professor Sunstein, Chevron
has become "a kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbuy, for the administrative state."
Id.
245. Pierce, supra note 232, at 304.
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Congress enacted legislation in an area where the federal government has plenary powereu6As a result, federal courts are
generally reluctant t o scrutinize government action too closely
in the area of immigration law when it involves those who seek
admission to this country.z47 Furthermore, aliens found
excludable on ideological grounds are not entitled t o any constitutional guarantees.248 The doctrine, frequently applied by
the courts, has been universally criticized by legal commentators as a means "to shield the executive branch's immigration
decisions from meaningful judicial review."249But note that
the Court in Fiallo u. Bell did reserve a role for the judiciary
should the political branches of government ever transgress the
constitutional boundaries of their discretion in determining the
nation's foreign policy goals and the means to achieve them.
Congress and the executive branch of government have been
particularly vigilant in avoiding such a constitutional controversy. The recent amendments to the INA7sgrounds of exclusion are such examples.
For those not indoctrinated with this notion of plenary
power, the realization that an area of the law exists over which
courts have little to adjudicate may seem anachronistic. In one
of the early cases addressing the plenary power doctrine, Justice Field wrote in The Chinese Exclusion Case250that "[tlhe
power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of
those sovereign powers delegated by the Con~titution."'~According to Field the exclusion of these foreigners from our
midst was "a proposition which we do not think open to controv e r ~ ~ . The
" ~ ' thrust
~
of his concern is that "if [an independent
nation] could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent

246. See, e.g., Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993
WIS. L. REV. 965 ("The plenary power doctrine provides the backbone for our constitutional tradition affecting aliens, placing nearly unfettered authority with the
political branches of the federal government.").
247. See id. at 967 n.7 ("The plenary power doctrine is a judicial creation by
which the Court severely limits its role in resolving immigration issues, while
exalting the role played by Congress and the executive branch.").
248. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 US. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.753
(1972).
249. Johnson, supra note 32, a t 443.
250. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
251. Id. at 609.
252. Id. at 603.
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subject to the control of another power."25s Three years later
in Nishimura Ekiu u. United States:% the Court described
the doctrine in terms of "an accepted maxim of international
law."255
These oft-cited passages referring to the inherent power of
the sovereign t o exclude aliens leave open a number of questions about the nature of the source of the federal power to
enact and to regulate immigration laws. Both confusion and
concern exist as to the constitutional source of this power, o u r
republic being a union whose government exercises only those
powers which are enumerated in the Constitution-and such
implied powers as are necessary and proper. It is generally
accepted that the power to regulate the flow of aliens over our
borders is inherent in the concept of sovereignty.256Thus, by
virtue of the inherent authority of the executive in foreign
affairs matters, coupled with the plenary power doctrine, judicial review in this particular area of immigration law is usually
a somewhat restrictive activity, a limitation that undoubtedly
causes much consternation amongst activist judges.
The majority in Abourezk, consistent with this reasoning,
concluded that Congress intended foreign policy concerns to
rank among the national interests whose protection would
justify exclusion of an alien under subsection 27.257According
to the majority, "the broad language of subsection 27 evince[d]
no intent to restrict the kinds of governmental concerns that
would qualify; the subsection speaks of 'public interest[,] . . .
welfare, safety, or security' and places no limitation on these
encompassing terms.'a58 In Judge Ginsburg's opinion, "[olnly
an isolationist view patently inconsistent with the reality of our
late twentieth century world could account for a belief that the
'public interest' and the 'national welfare' did not depend, in

253. Id. at 604.
254. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
255. Id.
256. LOUISHENKIN,
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION
22 (1972) (noting
that "the dif£iculty of locating a constitutional source for the foreign affairs power
probably produced the unique theory expressed that the foreign affairs powers
derive not from the Constitution at all, but rather are inherent in the notion of a
sovereign nation").
257. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1043, 1053 @.C. Cir. 1986), affd per
curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). Up to this point, the majority was in agreement with
the district court's analysis.
258. Id.
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part, on the effective execution of our foreign policy.'n5g Further, Judge Ginsburg exhorted the court not t o adopt such "a
counterintuitive interpretation of expansive statutory Ianguage." Judge Ginsburg also noted that the plaintiffs had not
identified anything in the legislative history or administrative
practice t o suggest that Congress intended t o exclude foreign
policy concerns from consideration under subsection (27).260
In light of this discourse, the majority need not have embarked
upon the next analytical inquiry under the Chevron test.
In discussing the foregoing principles at the outset, Judge
Bork assigned them great weight because of their conclusive
effect on the outcome of this case. According t o Bork, the majority opinion failed to give the requisite weight t o them.261Similarly, I view such a discussion as critical t o a well-reasoned
opinion in an immigration case, given the nature of the inherent authority of the government in this area of the law. Adjudicating these cases out of their historical context may cause a
court to lose sight of the correct task at hand and possibly give
way t o the temptation to substitute its own judgment.
When coupled with the inherent power of the sovereign t o
exclude aliens,262which is so "intricately interwoven" with
the conduct of foreign policy, 2aa contrary conclusion requires
clear authority to overcome the plenary nature of the
government's power. Otherwise, such an intrusion on the Executive would be unwarranted. And because this authority does
not stem alone from the "legislative power but is inherent in
the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nat i ~ n , courts
" ~ ~ ~should, therefore, hesitate before making such
an intrusion which, in effect, limits or embarrasses such powe r ~ . ~ ~ ~
However, by recognizing the need t o give deference to the
government because of the nature of its authority in this area,
I do not intend, by any means, t o imply that I accept the
government's approach as a matter of policy. As practitioners
noted in their call for legislative reform of these ideological

Id. at 1053.
Id.
Id. at 1064.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952).
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
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grounds of exclusion "to remove that shadow of hypocrisy and
to affirm the principles underlying our Bill o r Rights":
While our intellectual and political life is damaged, these
exclusion provisions also mar our moral image, here and
abroad. They cannot be reconciled with our role as signatory
to an international agreement intended to encourage the free
exchange of ideas and movement of citizens, or with our condemnation of injustices in other countries.266

Note also that these practitioners "lobbied" Congress, not the
courts, to repeal the controversial ideological grounds of exclu~ i o n . ~And
~ ' in a more philosophical vain, a single practitioner representing an individual in a deportation case involving
one of these ideological grounds noted the following:
There is a fundamental tension between the desire to be free
individuals and the desire to be part of a community that
defines itself through ffirming particular substantive values.
That tension is encapsulated in the First Amendment, which
suggests that our nation's primary substantive value is government neutrality in the sphere of substantive values. But
too much freedom threatens our sense of community. The
McCarran-Walter Act thus sets the boundaries for our freedom. But a t what price? It affirms our faith in democracy by
casting out people who believe in other systems of government. I t affirms our faith in pluralism by barring from our
borders anyone who is perceived as advocating totalitarianism. I t privileges narrow nationalist self-definition over the
uninhibited exchange of ideas, which is itself one of our most
important freedoms. I t promotes "freedom" by denying the
h d a m e n t a l humanity of another human being. The question
that the McCarran-Walter Act raises is whether a country
can ever call itself pluralist or humanist when it expels and
excludes persons like [Margaret] Randall because they hold
dissenting points of view?68

Given an academic's role, notwithstanding our own political views, it is not inappropriate for us to criticize the judicial
process. I view judges' roles, however, quite differently. In that
role, other considerations come into play and, therefore, re-

266. Visa Denials, supra note 128, at 264.
267. Id. at 249-50.
268. David Cole, What's A Metaphor?: The Deportation of A Poet, 1 YALEJ.L.
& LIB.10 (1989).
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strain their conduct. This is not to suggest that judges cannot
express their criticism of a particular policy in their opinis ~part of the process of engaging in judicial cani o n ~This
. ~ ~
dor. Ultimately such candor can inform the legislative process.
CANDOR
AND
VI. A WORDON JUDICIAL
INTERPRETIVE
SUBTERFUGE

Abourezk raises starkly the issue of judicial candor. Neither opinion can be read without a strong suspicion that other
agendas were animating the writers' hands while couched in
originalist rhetoric. Both opinions announce allegiance to the
guiding principles of Chevron then take off in entirely different
directions of analysis. To the extent that there are overlapping
areas of accord, they are explained away. This is not necessarily surprising because, as some commentators have observed,
appellate courts tend to give Chevron either a strong or weak
reading which allows them to, in effect, dictate the outcome of
a particular case while maintaining the appearance of
legitirna~y.~'~
As stated earlier, immigration is an area of the law in
which the judiciary's role is perceived as quite limited.271According to commentators, it is an area in which constitutional
enlightenment has not taken a substantial hold.272AS such,
the temptation to do 'justice" and uphold the traditional constitutional values of this society is very great.
But in today's legal climate, rare is the occasion that a
jurist must succumb to this temptation. In his article on judicial candor, Professor Shapiro observes that in modern society
"
questions of morality may
we aspire t o be j ~ s t . ~Although
profoundly affect the dynamic nature of the decision-making
process in certain cases, "the judge's allegiance t o both law and

269. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 837-41 @.C.
Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
270. See, e.g., Pierce, supm note 232, at 307, 310-12 (Such activity is tantamount to "judicial resolution of [a policy issue] through a process disguised as
statutory interpretation.").
271. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977).
272. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 19; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens,
Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CON^. COMM.9 (1990); Schuck, supra
note 2.
273. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARv. L. REV.731,
750 (1987) (noting that in today's legal climate, we are not faced with the kind of
social dilemmas that plagued our society in earlier years); see id. at 749 n.86.
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candor must be considered in determining his moral
For Professor Shapiro, judges have an absolute moral duty t o
candor in rendering their opinions. Candor is thus a part of the
judiciary fundioning responsibly.275So when faced with a
temptation t o do justice in a particular case, a judge cannot
escape her predicament "by concluding that the legal right
itself is a function of whatever morality requires."276According to Professor Shapiro, "a judge's fidelity t o law can be fairly
measured only if judges believe what they say in their opinions
and orders.'n77In other words, judges should be more forthcoming about the real reasons for their decisions if they are not
consistent with the applicable rules or standards.i78 Thus,
simple disagreement with the governing rule or standard
should not be enough to trigger judicial activism to correct
perceived injustices.
In the &ea of statutory interpretation, judges who follow a
"weak" reading of Chevron may engage in judicial updating
through a process of interpretive subterfuge.27gFor some
commentators, they assert that judges engage in judicial updating of statutes while "shrouding their decisions in the rhetoric
of originalist interpretati~n."~~'
But perhaps as Professor
Zeppos has observed, it is not so easy to be critical of this type
of judicial conduct.281
-

274. Id. at 749-50.
275. David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV.
519, 569 (1988).
276. Shapiro, supra note 273, at 750.
277. Id.
278. But see Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial
Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 672, 733 (1987) (opining that "a request for such candor probably
asks too much of the judicial system"). See also Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89
MICH. L. REV. 296, 297 (1990) (observing that "[landid opinions do not offer reasons judges know do not persuade them").
279. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 358-59 (noting that "complaints about the lack
of candor also have a long tradition in the common lawn).
280. Id. at 395.
281. Professor Zeppos states:
It is also possible that judges reach a result consistent with their personal preferences but convince themselves that they have done no more than
read the originalist evidence. Thus, if we asked these judges to be candid
and to tell us their "real" reasons, they would look genuinely puzzled and
point to their written opinions. Having persuaded themselves that they
did not make policy, they would be incapable of candidly unmasking their
originalist opinion.
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The lack of candor, self-deception or, simply, a lack of selfawareness, in the Abourezk case comes as no surprise.2s2But
the fact that such lack of candor is commonplace should not
prevent academics from engaging in a critical discourse about
such judicial conduct, particularly in the area of statutory interpretation with its attendant concerns about legitimacy, in
view of legislative supremacy. Such a critique is necessary t o
prevent the abuse of judicial power.28sThe problem of candor
in judging is much more complex, however, than the discussion
permits2LU
and thus beyond the scope of this article. Although
such conduct may be an unconscious form of judicial updating
it remains, nonetheas some commentators have 0bserved,2~~
less, a form of self-deception.

One suspects that Judge Ginsburg simply disagreed with
the government's position but felt constrained in rejecting it
outright, thus the ordered remand.286Given the fact that the
activities in which the foreign nationals planned to engage
included, among others, the delivery of speeches-activities
that surely implicate the First Amendment-it is hard not to
be suspicious of the Administration's motives in denying the
visa requests. I suspect that the government was concerned
that these particular aliens would be speaking to American
groups and propounding a viewpoint considered embarrassing
t o the United States or in some manner contrary to the best
interests of United States foreign
Because of the
Id. at 409. Professor Zeppos opines ultimately that perhaps the problem isn't "so
much a lack of candor . . . but [rather] a lack of self-awareness in judging." Id. at
411.
282. Id. at 402.
283. Shapiro, supru note 273, at 736-37. Legal realists used to refer to this
kind of judicial conduct as "judicial deception." See JEROME
FRANK,
LAW AND THE
MODERNMIND 40-41, 248-51 (1930).
284. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 408.
285. Id. at 410-11 (referring to Professor's Aleinikoff's nautical approach utilizing originalist interpretive tools as judges unconsciously adopting judicial updating
of statutes by reading them in a "present-minded" fashion).
286. Of note, on remand the district court found the government's evidence of
administrative practice and congressional acquiescence insufficient to support its
construction of section 212(a)(27) to authorize exclusion on the basis of mere entry
alone. Abourezk v. Reagap, Nos. 83-3739, 83-3895, 1988 US. Dist LEXIS 5203, at
*8 (D.D.C. June 7, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. Ne). Again, the government
took an appeal. Id. (appeal docketed, No. 88-5235 @.C. Cir. July 26, 1988)).
287. Rick Atkinson, Congressmen, Others Denounce Denial of Visas to Critics of
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overlap between foreign policy considerations and first amendment guarantees, suspicion would naturally attach t o any denial under subsection 27 rather than under subsection 28.288
But these grounds of exclusion were not mutually exclusive. If
a foreign visitor is excludable on one ground, she may also be
excluded on any of the other grounds in the Act. So even
though subsection 28, a waivable exclusion ground, was applicable in the Abourezk case, the alien could, nonetheless, have
been excluded under subsection 27.
A plausible explanation for the government's reluctance t o
identify the reasons for denial on the basis of "activities"-as
being prejudicial to the national interest-is sensitivity to the
First Amendment concerns that would naturally arise.z8g
Kindly put, such an interpretation does reflect the
government's sensitivity to charges that it is attempting t o suppress free exchange of ideas o r deprive these speakers of a
United States audience. While one may deplore such conduct, it
is well within the government's authority t o so legislate. Thus
the government elected, arguably, to advance the interpretation
that entry and mere presence was a sufficient basis for denial
on foreign policy grounds in this case specifically to avoid raising a constitutional, or more specifically, a disfavored policy
issue. Although it is accepted doctrine that the government has
the substantive power to deny entry on grounds that implicate
first amendment guarantees, the district court judge would
have found, nonetheless, such a reason for denial of the visas
~bjectionbble.~~

U.S., THE WASH.
POST, Dec. 3, 1983, at A12.
288. See H.R. CONF.REP. NO. 955, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1990). Therefore,
the agency's practice may seem suspect. Legally speaking, however, it was not unlawful or contrary to statutory authority to do so.
LAW REPORT63 (1986). According to the author of the
289. 5 IMMIGRA~ON
article in the Immigration Law Report, "[tlhis Administration's sensitivity to the
issue . . . is symptomatic of the real problems underlying both 8 212(a)(27) and
(a)(28)." Id. The author also opined that proposals then pending in Congress would
have amended these former grounds for exclusion to assure their application only
in cases in which the national security is involved, "a standard much more in
keeping with American political values and foreign policy principles, insofar as
those principles seek to encourage democratic traditions and institutions abroad."
Id. As discussed above, this is apparently what Congress has done.
290. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 88687 (D.D.C. 1984) ("For although the government may deny entry to aliens altogether, or for any number of
specific reasons, it may not, consistent with the First Amendment, deny entry
solely on account of the content of speech."). As a precautionary note, the district
court later remarked:
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Another reason which the government has steadfastly held
to is the distinction drawn between visa denials based on organizational associations and those relating to governmental
associations. In Abourezk all visa applicants had governmental
contacts, according to DOS officials. As such, the denials under
these circumstances are entirely plausible despite the literal
language which seems to cast a much narrower net of exclusion.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have upheld the
lower court's finding on this issue unless the appellate court
found the finding clearly erroneous.291Of course, one recognizes the difficulty inherent in making this determination without evidence in the record-and none exists on this point for
purposes of review-in light of the in camera proceedings in the
district court. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals should have
addressed the issue of resolving such disputes by way of in
camera proceedings instead of going off on its own frolic and
detour.
As a practical matter, judges are no different than anyone
else. Thus, application of governing legal doctrine is not the
only influence on judicial decision-making. When faced with
two or more legitimate dispositions in deciding a particular
case, they are likely t o choose the one that is most consistent
with their political views or philosophies on the interpretation
and application of the law or policy. One commentator has
aptly described these factors as external.292

To find the conclusory statement that the entry of a particular individual
would be contrary to United States foreign policy objectives to be a "facially legitimate" reason would be to surrender to the Executive total
discretion even in cases such as these where it is claimed-and the claim
is not implausible-that entry is being denied solely on account of the
content of the alien's proposed speech.
Id. at 888.
291. Although the majority seemed highly critical of the district court's handling of this matter in camera, under the circumstances it seemed to be the best
approach. It served a supervisory function as well. As the district court remarked:
Moreover, judicial scrutiny of the specific reasons for denials of entry will
have the beneficial effect of preventing both a mushrooming of exclusions
based on the provision here at issue and content-based denials.
Id. at 888 (footnotes omitted).
292. According to Professor Stephen Legomsky, one can apply to the immigration cases "the increasingly well accepted view that various factors not typically
acknowledged in courts' opinions contribute heavily to the results." STEPHEN
LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICSIN BRFTAXNAND
AMERICA225 (1987). Among the "external" factors that influence judicial decision-
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That fkeedom, though broad, is not limitless.293The flexibility inherent in the judicial process is constrained by the now
familiar "steadying factors" that Karl Llewellyn assembled as a
response t o what he perceived as the excesses of legal realism.
The Chevron mandate requires agency deference in appropriate
cases. When such a case presents itself, the judge's focus is on
determining whether the agency's construction is a reasonable
one. Like the earlier articulated "steadying factors," consideration of reasonableness is another approach that functions as a
constraint on judicial decisionmaking. But "probably the most
si@icant of those constraints is the professional office occupied by the judge."294
Thus, in examining an opinion of a judge in an immigration case, one must factor into the discussion the limitations
inherent in the law.295Indeed, most commentators writing in
this area believe, whether so stated or not, that judges should
be more activist-oriented given the constraints already inherent
in the law.296Then add to these constraints the notion that
as a matter of principle courts should defer t o an agency interpretation, it is not surprising that judges influenced by ideological forces will strain to fmd a way around such a principle.297
making in the immigration sphere are:
the personal backgrounds and political attitudes of the judges; the judges'
own perceptions of their roles in the legal system; and the political forces-'political'
here being used in its broadest sense to encompass social
and economic forces as well-prevailing in society at the time cases are
decided.
Id.
293. Id. at 224.
294. Id. (citing KARLLLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON
LAWTRADITION-DECIDING
APPEALS 45-46 (1960)).
295. See, e.g., CHARLESFRIED,ORDERAND LAW:ARGUINGTHE REAGANREVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT
212 n.10 (1991) ("Bent upon relieving the harshneqs of deportation orders, appellate judges have consistently distorted the immigration laws.").
296. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 32, at 455 ("The law is well-known for the
considerable discretion delegated to the Attorney General over many immigration
decisions, discretion that is equalled in few administrative schemes.").
297. See generally ROBE^ H. BORK, THE TEMPTINGOF AMERICA: THE POLITICAI, SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW52-129 (1990) (discussing such ideological factors). But
cf. P. Irons, Making Law: The Case for Judicial Activism, 24 VALPARAISO
U. L.
REV. 35, 37 (1989) (remarking that "we need the weapon of judicial activism in
order to p r o w members of "discrete and insular" minorities from the tyranny of
the majority"); Johnson, supm note 32, at 419 ("Because the INS has demonstrated
an anti-immigrant, pro-enforcement bias, and because the executive branch has
tremendous leeway in the foreign policy realm, deference is ill-advised in the immigration context.").
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The most likely explanation for any individual decision,
therefore, is the specific legal doctrine articulated in the opinion. At the outset, a court's refusal t o interfere with Congress
on the issue of immigration results from the impact of the
plenary power decisions.298These decisions were accompanied
by reasoned opinions. Then add to the mix a decision controlled
by a statute, a limiting factor in judicial decision-making because the legislature is the superior law-making body in this
situation.299And judges, for the most part, adhere to the doctrine of legislative supremacy in deciding such cases.3wA further limiting factor is judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute which Congress has delegated to it t o
implement and administer. Such deference is lacking in the
majority's opinion.

B. Agency Deference
Judge Bork's approach t o deciding this case was consistent
with judicial deference to an agency interpretation that was,
arguably as previously discussed, reasonable under the circums t a n c e ~ . But
~ ~ ' the emphasis on the legislative history as supporting this interpretation is misplaced. As discussed earlier,
the evidence in the legislative history "tugged in both directions." Nonetheless, the result was consistent with the Chevron
mandate because the central question was the reasonableness
of the agency's construction. Given that the legislative history
did not preclude such an interpretation, that should have been
the end of the discussion on that point.
The Supreme Court has always said (e.g., Fiallo v. Bell)
that it is for Congress and not the courts t o decide this nation's
immigration policy. If we are afraid to hear what others have
t o say then it's a sad commentary on our society. But we as a

298. Peter Schuck states:
For almost a century, the Supreme Court has treated immigration law
as sui generis. It has bestowed upon Congress the untrammeled authority
to make decisions concerning the admission and expulsion of aliens. So
great has been the power of the word "immigration" that its mere mention has been enough to propel the Court into a cataleptic trance.
Schuck, supra note 2, at 6-7.
299. REYNOLDS,
supra note 62, at 184.
300. Compare Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. LJ. 281 (1989) with William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L J . 319 (1989).
301. See Pierce, supra note 232, at 308.
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people, through the electorate, not the judiciary, make such
choices. And because agencies are likely to be more accountable
to the electorate (as expressed by who is elected as President)
than the courts, agencies should have the dominant role in
matters of
Moreover, Congress is the most appropriate arena for this discussion given all the political patticipants,
i.e., congresspeople, staffers, lobbyists, and agency officials.
Also, the efforts of the judiciary in such cases as Abourezk and
Allende cannot substitute for congressional attention to this issue, and in fact are likely to create more problems than they
solve as they strain for interpretations of the immigration statute that may have unintended consequences.303
In general, when the legislature has chosen t o work
through an administrative agency t o realize its purposes, and
therefore, presumptively, to confer on it some policy-making
function, deference to the agency's construction of the statute
should normally be permitted to function unless the judge is
convinced that the purpose of the statute is contradicted. In
this case, there appears t o be no significant evidence of such a
contradiction.
Professor Kenneth Davis argues that courts are the experts
"on many types of issues, including constitutional law, common
law, ethics, overall philosophy of law and government, procedural fairness, judge-made law developed through statutory
interpretation, most analysis of legislative history, and problems transcending the field of the particular agency."304As
for ascertaining a statute's meaning, according t o Professor
Diver, "[tlhe conventional wisdom . . favors agen~ies."~"
Moreover, agencies are more knowledgeable about the circumstances surrounding a statute's enactment.306Therefore, in
appropriate circumstances, judges should be restrained in their
decisionmaking to avoid policymaking under the guise of interpreting statutes.307
In the administrative state, agencies should have the dominant role in policymaking when the choice is between agencies

.

302. Id. at 307.
303. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 124, at 811.
LAW TREATISE 393 (2d ed. 1984).
304. 5 KENNETHC. DAVIS,ADMINISI'RATIVE
305. Diver, supra note 1, at 583.
306. Id. at 575.
307. Of note is the fad that Kenneth Davis had once predicted that "considerable deviation from the doctrine . . . is likely" because Chevron's allocation of interpretive authority is "unnatural." Callahan, supra note 57, at 1295 11.102.
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and courts. Thus the central question of statutory interpretation posed here is whether agencies or courts should have
greater authority over the process of interpreting statutes.308
And because statutory interpretation is not "a search for direct
decision of precise questions [given that] Congress often doesn't
foresee how its laws will be applied or what the particular
circumstances will be,"309the courts should defer in appropriate cases t o the agency's construction of a matter involving
policy.
Instead the Abourezk majority employed unduly restrictive
approaches and other subterfuges in deciding this case, the
fxst one being that this was a special circumstances case requiring the court to avoid a constitutional confrontation.310
Since the Supreme Court had already decided the issue adversely to plaintiffs in an earlier case, no such confrontation
existed. Thus, shrouding the case in terms of statutory interpretation was merely a mechanism for side-stepping an issue
that had an easy answer.
Although the statutory issues in Abourezk were fairly complex, the constitutional ones were not. Supreme Court precedent in this area is quite clear and ~onsistent.~"
Thus the
majority in this case had to decide against the government on
the statutory issues. In doing so, the court focused on the
statute's legislative history. This approach afforded more flexibility in terms of the result in this
Also, the
majority's reference to the sweeping authority of the presidential proclamation as an added safety feature was equally disingenuous given the result-oriented nature of the decision.313
Furthermore, such a reference merely served to highlight the
underlying political nature of the decision in question which
should have pointed in the direction of allowing a "permissible"
agency interpretation. And as discussed earlier, the government found it necessary to resort to this authority to deal with

308. Diver, supra note 1, at 550-51.
309. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 397 n.258 (citing Professor Sunstein's judicial
panel comments).
310. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
311. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see also Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 881 (D.D.C.1984) (referring to the constitutional issue in
this case as "relatively straightforward").
312. See, e.g., Larry Evans et al., Congressional Procedure and Statutory Interpretation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV.239, 239 n.4 (1993).
313. Abourezk., 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2.
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the particular individuals in the consolidated cases. Much of
what transpired in this case subsequently was unnecessary.
The problem remains and will unfortunately continue because
the required deference to agencies causes courts t o surrender
too much control to agencies, particularly when reviewing decisions of those agencies popularly viewed as suspect.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many theories of statutory interpretation are the subject of
academic discourse in today's legal climate. But are any of
them satisfactory for application in the administrative context?
How well do the traditional tools really work in a case such as
Abourezk? If you apply the plain meaning rule as would a
textualist, the agency's interpretation falters. If you take a look
at the legislative history as would a student of the legal process
school, the issue of intent is inconclusive if not illusory. However, taking everything into account as a modified
intentionalist would, one could conclude that the agency's interpretation was permissible. This is particularly appropriate here
because it is such a highly deferential area of the law notwithstanding its detractors' criticism. Further, this is a matter that
goes to the very heart of how this nation defines itself, which is
accomplished through the processes employed by the legislative
and the executive branches of government. More importantly,
this is all that the Chevron mandate requires under these particular circumstances; namely, for the courts to ascertain the
reasonableness of the agency's construction, not whether they
would prefer something different, more enlightened or better.
There is no question that a comprehensive revision of the
national and security interests exclusion provisions was long
overdue. Born of an era long since past, and made even more
arcane with the recent fall of communism and the subsequent
political re-alignments worldwide, it nonetheless remained for
the political branches of government t o strike the appropriate
agreement on the contours of the newly enacted provision replacing subsection 27 and the surrounding political exclusion
grounds. Although severely limited in its scope, Congress still
accorded the executive branch explicit authority t o exclude
aliens on the basis of foreign policy considerations. No doubt
this is exactly what the courts were attempting to do. It is unlikely that any serious reform in this highly politicized area
could have been achieved short of a new world order. Nevertheless judicial intervention is not the answer.
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As a matter of policy, the agency's construction in Abourezk
was not unreasonable nor was it plainly inconsistent with other
INA statutory provisions. Under Chevron, it was therefore a
permissible construction that should have been given due deference. It was not given such deference because the majority
apparently seized the moment to, in effect, update the anachronistic provisions of this cold-war era statute or, at the very
least, frustrate the modern-day agency's actions in barring the
admission of undesirable foreign officials on foreign policy
grounds that probably did not run afoul of first amendment
implications.
All of this is by no means to suggest that the courts do not
play a role in the administrative context. The determination of
whether an agency's construction is "permissible" or "reasonable," albeit a constraining factor in the judicial process, is not
intended as an abdication of the judicial role in such matters.
In the administrative state, courts play a primary and necessary role of supervision when judges scrutinize agency decisions and interpretations of statutes. As the nation's moral
conscience, there is always a need for judicial scrutiny of agency conduct, but given that certain doctrines, judicially-created
no less, limit the role of the judiciary in certain areas of the
law, legal reformists should look to more appropriate venues
for their reform efforts.314But alas, such is the nature of judicial decision-making that promotes the judicial route as the
more appropriate avenue for achieving justice.

KENNETH C. DAVISAND RICHARDJ. PIERCE,JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
7 (3d ed. 1994) (opining that "[r]eviewing courts may have little
choice but to tolerate less accuracy and greater discretion in the agency
decisionmaking process" given the limited judicial resources and expanding administrative workloads).
314. See 1
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